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“Outsourcing Small Wars: Expanding the Role of Private Military Companies in 
U.S. Military Operations” argues that, under current domestic and international laws, and 
current military regulations and doctrine, the U.S. Army, with only a few uniformed 
personnel, could employ a force consisting of predominately private military companies 
(PMCs) to fight a small war for less-than-vital national interests of the United States.  
This thesis illustrates the historic precedents when the United States has 
outsourced traditionally military functions – specifically combat. Sometimes this 
outsourcing precedence has taken the form of working through partisans or indigenous 
personnel, and, at other times, the outsourcing closely resembled what many would 
consider as the hiring of mercenaries. In either case, the research classifies this type of 
outsourcing as surrogate warfare. The use of surrogate forces falls under U.S. military 
doctrine as unconventional warfare (UW) and, under that same doctrine, the U.S. Army 
Special Forces is organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct UW.  
There are risks involved in hiring PMCs, but those risks can be mitigated. The 
risk mitigations show that, if properly managed, PMCs can be trusted to perform in 
combat in the appropriate conflict environment. After the risks are studied, the laws 
involving outsourcing are analyzed. This includes international and domestic laws as well 
as U.S. Government contracting practices. In the recommendation portion, a Special 
Forces-led private military force (PMF) model is created to illustrate the viability of this 
concept.   
In summary, hiring PMCs is a form of employing surrogate forces. Hiring 
surrogates is a form of UW conducted by Special Forces. The risks of hiring PMCs can 
be mitigated and there are no laws or military regulations forbidding the Special Forces-
led PMF model. This model provides a viable option to the United States Government to 
engage in necessary conflicts that might otherwise be untenable given competing global 
troop deployments and uncertain perception of the nature of U.S. national interests 
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I. INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND  
Of the over 2.2 million servicemembers serving in the Total [U.S.] Force, 
over 364,000 are deployed today in 119 countries or at sea. Over 150,000 
of these deployed servicemembers are Reserve or National Guard. We 
currently have approximately 150,000 US servicemembers in Iraq [and] 
approximately 20,000 US servicemembers in Afghanistan. – General 
Richard Meyers, 2005 
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 created the modern nation-state. Until then, 
various city-states, kings, landlords, emperors, and businessmen had routinely employed 
mercenaries to fight their battles and wars. The creation of the nation-state would have 
seemed to eliminate the need for mercenaries due to the establishment and rise of national 
armies: but that was not the case. Mercenaries, or some form thereof, continued to be 
present, if not dominant, during modern conflicts. However, the term mercenary no 
longer accurately describes all of the private contractors on the battlefield. The term 
private military company (PMC) is a more accurate title for those who are outsourced for 
war.  
The term PMC came into use at the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1989, at least two events occurred that caused the rise of the private 
military industry (PMI). First, small states lost their superpower supporter in either the 
United States or the Soviet Union. This event allowed underlying currents to come to the 
forefront and small wars began to occur around the globe. Second, many countries began 
to scale down their militaries, which led to a surplus of military expertise in the 
international market (Singer, 2003).  
Contemporary PMCs operate globally, and the United States Government (USG) 
has made extensive use of their services in the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
There may be as many as 20,000 PMC employees in Iraq alone (Singer, 2003). This is 
equal to the total number of uniformed U.S. military personnel in all of Afghanistan.  The 
omnipresence of PMCs seems to indicate that at least some USG leaders believe that 
PMCs operate as legitimate businesses. If this is truly the case, then could PMCs do more 
to help the U.S. military? These PMCs probably could not be mobilized to fight North 
Korea or Iran, but they could be used to help fight some of the small wars in which the 
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U.S. sometimes gets involved, so that the U.S. military’s conventional forces could be 
held in reserve to fight major conflicts.    
The concept of a PMC force to prosecute a small war is not without precedence. 
Excluding pre-1990 examples, e.g. the Free Companies of the Middle Ages, the 
quintessential outsourcing example of a modern mercenary or surrogate army is 
Executive Outcomes (EO).1 In 1995, the Sierra Leone government hired EO, a South 
African PMC, for $35 million to fight a small war against the insurgent organization 
called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). With two hundred employees, EO routed 
the RUF and within twenty-one months helped bring the RUF’s leadership to the 
negotiation table. EO lost less than twenty personel. However, the cease-fire agreement 
required that EO leave Sierra Leone. Ninety-five days after EO’s departure, the president 
of Sierra Leone was overthrown and chaos returned to the country. Soon after, 
approximately 17,500 United Nations (U.N.) peacekeepers were sent to restore order but 
were largely ineffective and 500 peacekeepers became prisoners of the RUF (Singer, 
2003, pp. 112-115). This incident illustrates that EO served successfully as a surrogate 
force for the Sierra Leone government and that the operation, as defined by JP 1-02, 
could be labeled as unconventional warfare (UW). If the success of EO can be replicated, 
and the U.S. is willing to do so, would the EO experience serve as a possible model for 
the U.S. to be able to fight small wars?  
The United States Armed Forces are currently heavily engaged in the two 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. With the commitment of these U.S. troops, as well as 
other routine troop deployments to areas like South Korea, the U.S. military is facing a 
difficult challenge in providing adequate forces to all of the “hot spots” in the world. 
According to General Richard Meyers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if the 
United States had to enter another war, the military would win the war but on an 
extended and unknown timeline. He specifically referred to a North Korean invasion of 
South Korea (Emanuel, 2005, May 3). Yet, what is unique about the Korean Peninsula is 
 
1 A third event, not mentioned in connection with the Cold War, that created an environment in which 
PMCs could flourish, was the end of apartheid in South Africa. Once the African National Congress (ANC) 
took power of the country, it disbanded many of the elite units of the South African Defense Force (SADF) 
so that these apartheid-securing units could not threaten the new regime. Several members of these 
decommissioned units formed EO, which fought effectively in two small wars in Angola and Sierra Leone. 
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that the U.S. places a high importance on the peninsula itself, which in turn positions 
South Korea’s defense within the U.S. vital national interests. So, if a conflict erupted on 
the Korean peninsula, then the USG would automatically send a large amount of troops 
to protect it. But what if a conflict breaks out in a country where a threat to U.S. vital 
national interests could not readily be seen or is nonexistent? With two wars already 
ongoing and nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran looming, would the U.S. send 
troops to ostensibly less strategic countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, or 
Rwanda if those states’ governments requested help? Or what if another Rwanda-type 
genocide seemed inevitable, or a Somalia-scale humanitarian relief effort became 
necessary, would the U.S. send help? The answer is not certain but what is clear is that 
another U.S. troop deployment on the scale of the United Nations Somalia II (UNASOM 
II) mission, requiring 25,000 U.S. troops, would further stretch the U.S. military and 
make mission success more difficult to attain. In that regard, there might be other options 
to further extending the U.S. military as it exits today.    
The journalist Max Boot offers the concept of creating a “Freedom Legion,” 
similar to that of the French Foreign Legion, to serve the United States. This unit would 
consist of internationally recruited individuals vying for U.S. citizenship, which would be 
granted after a predetermined term of enlistment. It would be led by serving U.S. officers 
and noncommissioned officers. The creation of the legion would help with the U.S. 
military recruiting goals and  
[t]he Freedom Legion would be the perfect unit to employ in places such 
as Darfur [Sudan] that are not critical security concerns but that cry out for 
more effective humanitarian intervention than any international 
organization could muster. U.S. politicians, so wary (and rightly so) of 
casualties among U.S. citizens, might take a more lenient attitude toward 
the employment of a force not made up of their constituents (Boot, 2005a).  
A “Freedom Legion” is a creative option for employing the U.S. military in global 
crises. Another option is sending PMCs.  
A. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
“Outsourcing Small Wars: Expanding the Role of Private Military Companies in 
U.S. Military Operations” provides an alternative course of action to large-scale troop 
deployments to areas around the globe that are not within U.S. vital national interests. 
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Countries like Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone arguably have little 
influence on U.S. vital national interests, yet the United States sometimes finds itself in a 
situation where it might want to come to their aid, as in Somalia in 1993.2 Maybe the 
United States’ willingness to help is because it values the principles of freedom and 
democracy and wants other countries to have the same access to these principles, or 
maybe because the United States has a unique role as the sole superpower in the world 
and many countries in the world seem to look to the United States for help. Whatever the 
reason, the current demands on the U.S. military will most likely inhibit any near-term 
troop deployment that does involve its vital national interests. The main purpose of this 
thesis is to introduce an alternative course of action for providing military assistance 
while still classifying the operation as a U.S. military one.      
Another concern this thesis addresses is minimizing the exposure of U.S. forces to 
hostile environments where the USG and public want to engage but are unlikely to 
tolerate casualties. In October 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, the U.S. military lost 
eighteen soldiers in an intensive firefight with local militia forces. Some of the fallen 
soldiers’ bodies were desecrated, and television cameras captured the scene. In the United 
States, there was an emotional reaction from the public, and days later the U.S. pulled out 
of Somalia (Bowden, 1999). Juxtapose this situation with an incident in Fallujah, Iraq, 
March 2004, where four employees (all of whom were prior Special Operations Forces 
from the U.S. military) from BlackwaterUSA, a PMC, were killed and their bodies 
subsequently mutilated on public television (Ross, 2005). The U.S. public outcry was not 
as emotional or loud as it was during the Somali incident. There are several reasons why 
this was the case. One reason might be that the U.S. public is more acceptable of 
casualties in Iraq because of the frequency of casualties in that operation and the 
importance of the mission. Another reason might be because the soldiers in Somalia were 
sent to fight in a conflict that clearly fell outside of the definition of vital national 
interests, and, therefore, lacked a perceived justification for the soldiers being there at all, 
let alone sacrificing their lives. Yet in the Iraqi case, the ex-soldiers were contractors and 
seasoned veterans who knew and weighed the risks before accepting the contract.  
 
2 One could argue that these are the very type of countries in which terrorists could hide; therefore, 
becoming involved with these countries does, in fact, fall within U.S. vital national interests. However, this 
thesis assumes that, at least historically, these countries typically fall outside of U.S. vital interests.   
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With these two purposes in mind – reducing U.S. troop deployments to areas of 
less-than-vital interest, and avoiding U.S. military casualties whenever possible, this 
thesis will create a model of how PMCs can be used by the USG to help fight small wars. 
This thesis first illustrates the historic precedence for the United States to outsource. 
Sometimes this outsourcing precedence takes the form of working through partisans or 
indigenous personnel, and, at other times, the outsourcing closely resembles what many 
would classify as hiring mercenaries. In either case, the research classifies this type of 
outsourcing as surrogate warfare. The use of surrogate forces falls under U.S. military 
doctrine as Unconventional Warfare (UW) and, under that same doctrine, the U.S. Army 
Special Forces are designed to conduct UW (JP 1-02, 2004, p. 494). The next section 
addresses several of the risks involved with hiring PMCs and how those risks can be 
mitigated. The risk mitigations show that, if properly managed, PMCs can be trusted in 
the right environment. After the risks are addressed, then the laws involving outsourcing 
are analyzed. This includes international and domestic laws as well as U.S. government 
(USG) contracting practices. The last section of the thesis contains the recommendation 
of a Special Forces-led Private Military Force (PMF) model. This model illustrates how a 
Special Forces element would manage the organization, what the key components of the 
contract have to be for proper management and accountability, and an example of how 
the PMC would be manned given current PMCs on the market. 
This project will not address several issues commonly discussed when dealing 
with PMCs. The retention of Special Operations Forces (SOF) will not be addressed. The 
hiring of PMCs by foreign states or not-state actors (e.g. corporations, terrorists, drug 
cartels, etc.) will not be addressed directly. Also, the argument generally involved with 
whether a PMC employee is a mercenary or not will be left to someone else; however, 
this thesis will show some differences between the PMCs and mercenaries. Finally, 
outsourcing could potentially mean outsourcing just about any military function; 
however, this thesis focuses on the “combat” and “combat enablers” aspect of 






1. Research Questions 
The initial thesis question that inspired this work is the following: How can, 
within existing laws and military practices, the private military industry (PMI) take on 
more of a role to help alleviate the current deployment tempo that the U.S. forces are 
facing today? To further investigate this question, the following subsequent questions are 
asked: 
a.  Is there a way to help other countries in need of assistance without 
subjecting too many U.S. forces to harm? 
b.  What are the risks involved in hiring a PMC? 
c.  Can PMCs be trusted to help fight the U.S.’s wars? 
d.  Can PMCs be regulated through current international and domestic laws? 
e.  Who would manage or lead a PMC force?  
f.  Does U.S. military contracting doctrine and regulations exist that could be 
implemented to employ a U.S. led PMC force? 
g.  What is the legal status for PMCs during a conflict? Do their employees 
have any protections? 
h.  Who is accountable for PMCs if their employees commit a human rights 
violation, violate the law of land warfare, or simply commit a crime?  
2.  Assumptions 
The first assumption of this thesis is that the USG has the political will to allow a 
Special Forces-led PMF to operate. There is understandably considerable political risk if 
an operation with this force is conducted improperly or it fails. Not only is that why the 
Special Forces element would manage the PMF in the model, but this management is the 
legitimacy that demonstrates to the domestic and international community that the U.S. is 
taking responsibility for the operation and not leaving it to a purely private force. Of 
course the United States is already contracting a significant amount of PMCs, but these 
PMCs primarily engage in security, logistics, or advisory roles. Although these roles are 
also needed in the Special Forces-led PMF model, the model also allows for the PMCs to 
conduct offensive operations if necessary. It is this offensive capability that the USG has 
to accept for this model to succeed.  
The second assumption of this thesis is that the U.S. will continue to follow, as 
closely as possible, the section of the Weinberger Doctrine which states that the U.S. 
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should not send troops to a conflict unless U.S. vital national interests are at stake. Some 
may disagree on whether the U.S. should follow this doctrine or not but nonetheless it 
seems to be prevalent in the USG’s decision making process. One example of this is 
during the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The Tutsi Rwandans needed help but the U.S. choose 
not to intervene. This could have been because of the recent policy failure and military 
defeat in Somalia, October 1993, but it is probably also because Rwanda’s problems did 
not affect U.S. vital national interests. As a result, the U.S., and many other countries did 
not provide forces and an estimated 800,000 Rwandans died. This thesis raises the 
question, although it does not directly answer it, of whether a Special Forces-led PMF 
force could have stopped the genocide?  
The third assumption is that the USG and its citizens more readily accept the 
deaths of PMC employees over soldiers. Although the previously mentioned Mogadishu, 
Somalia vs. Fallujah, Iraq case indicates that this might be the case, there is not any 
research available that can definitively lead to this conclusion. However, this assumption 
does seem intuitive and so is used for this thesis. 
 The final assumption is that the U.S. may decide to use contractors even if they 
are not less expensive then sending U.S. troops. The cost advantage of outsourcing has 
not definitively been determined yet. One recent article states that a PMC employee costs 
approximately $100,000 a year while a soldier in a comparable position costs $110,000 
when benefits and retirement are figured (Matthews, 2004). The cost of a PMC employee 
can be easily determined through his or her paycheck, but a soldier could have 
individually varying cost factors distinguishing him or her from another soldier in the 
same position. Hypothetically speaking, one soldier could be single and cost the military 
only his or her base pay plus benefits. Another soldier, while living in the highest cost of 
living area in the country, which the military compensates to some degree, could have 
four dependents, one of which might require serious medical attention, have had the laser 
eye surgery performed and braces put on. Of course, there is nothing wrong with this 





                                                
3. Definition of Terms 
The following list of definitions provides the reader with a common frame of 
reference for how certain unique terms are used in this thesis. Initial efforts were made to 
draw definitions directly from official or military sources. If a definition or explanation 
did not exist among these sources, then academic sources had to be used.  
Counterinsurgency: “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (JP 1-02, 
2004, p. 127).  
Mercenary3: The term “mercenary” is not particularly useful for this thesis but 
must be discussed because the term is inevitably used whenever one discusses PMCs. It 
is an extremely abused label that some will throw towards any category of fighters who 
are not born in the state for which they are fighting. For example, the term “green card 
mercenary” refers to the 32,000 foreign soldiers who serve in the U.S. military but wear 
“U.S. Army” on their uniform (Heinz, 2005, May 26). This thesis will not rely on a 
definition of mercenary except when explaining how others view the privatization of 
warfare. That being stated, the most notable definition for a mercenary comes from the 
U.N.: A mercenary one who is recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict, who is motivated for the desire of private gain and that gain exceeds that paid to 
combatants of national forces who are party to the conflict. A mercenary is neither a 
member of the armed forces that are party to the conflict in which they are engaged nor 
sent in an official capacity by a party of the conflict (Protocol, 1977).  
Military Outsourcing: “The process of contracting out to private companies 
tasks that used to be performed by members of the uniformed military” (Iraq: Military 
Outsourcing, 2004).  
 
3 This definition is adapted from the list of attributes that qualify someone as a mercenary from Article 
47 to Protocol 1 of the 1977 Addition to the 1949 Geneva Convention. Article 47 is written in its entirety in 
Chapter IV. Although this definition is the most internationally recognized description of a mercenary, it is 
not unanimously agreed upon.    
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Private Military Company (PMC)4: If the definition of mercenary seems to be a 
matter of opinion, the definition of a PMC is even worse. In fact, most explanations about 
PMCs are a comparison of how PMCs differ from mercenaries. P.W. Singer’s description 
of PMCs is no different. In his book, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized 
Military Industry, he states that Private Military Firms (another name for a PMCs) 
provide military services that are “commercial enterprise[s] first and foremost … [that 
are] organized into registered businesses that trade and compete openly (for the most 
part) … with a clear executive hierarchy that includes boards of directors and share-
holdings … driven by business profit rather than individual profit [like that of a 
mercenary] … [and] are considered legal entities bound to their employers by recognized 
contracts ….” (pp. 45-47). In a later article, Singer states that PMCs “… are businesses 
that provide governments with professional services intricately linked to warfare; they 
represent, in other words, the corporate evolution of the age-old profession of 
mercenaries” (2005). This is a broad summary of a several page explanation for the 
definition of a PMC, but it should serve as a good basis for understanding how the term 
PMC will be used during the thesis; plus, there are not any current definitions of PMCs 
that conflict with Singer’s.  
Private Military Force (PMF): A PMF is the combination of all the necessary 
PMCs to accomplish a given mission.  
Small War5:  The United States Marine Corps (USMC) Small Wars/21st Century 
manual (2005)6 provides as close to an official definition for small wars can be found 
within current doctrinal manuals. The definition is the following:  
Small Wars involve a wide range of military operations in conflicts 
involving states or nontraditional actors, generally over a protracted 
timeline, characterized by a combination of physical violence and non-
                                                 
4 The definition provided seems to be consistent with most authors who write on the subject. The only 
detractors would probably come from the group of authors who believe that PMCs are simply synonymous 
with mercenaries. This will be addressed further in Chapter IV.     
5 This is generally a non-standard term used in the military and academic community. However, as the 
thesis title indicates, understanding this term and agreeing on its definition is important to this work. If one 
combined the doctrinal definitions of counter-insurgency, unconventional war, Military Operations Other 
Than War (MOOTW), stability operations, and support operations (see Appendix A for the last three 
definitions) then one should get a flavor of what a small war consists.  
6 Because this is a USMC definition only, the other services do not necessarily follow it.  
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kinetic forms of influence requiring the tightly integrated application of 
diplomatic, informational, economic and military means (p. 3). Small wars 
are most often waged between asymmetrically empowered adversaries – 
one larger and more capable, one smaller and less capable when measured 
in traditional geostrategic or conventional military terms (p. 5).  
To further explain how this definition is used in the thesis, C.E. Callwell’s (1996) 
book, Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice, is referenced. He adds: “That the 
expression ‘small war’ has in reality no particular connection with the scale on which any 
campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations 
of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces” (p. 21). 
These two definitions combined should paint a fairly clear picture of how the term “small 
war” will be used in this thesis; however, one might note that this is a broad definition 
and just about any war could fall within it. For example, the USMC manual lists the U.S. 
conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan as small wars. One might argue that these conflicts 
were within U.S. vital national interests and the responsibility of the U.S. military. So, to 
further narrow how this definition of small wars will be used, this thesis will specifically 
address small wars that fall outside of perceived U.S. vital national interests.7 Examples 
of these conflicts that are, or would be considered, small wars if, or when, the U.S. 
became involved but are probably outside of U.S. vital interest are Somalia, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Rwanda.  
Surrogate: “to put in the place of another: a: to appoint as successor, deputy, or 
substitute for oneself” (Merriam-Webster, 2005). As applied to this thesis, a surrogate is 
someone or some entity that fights instead of the U.S. military or elements thereof.  
United States Army Special Forces8: “US Army forces organized, trained, and 
equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare 
capabilities” (JP 1-02, 2004, p. 494).  
                                                 
7 The Small Wars/21st Century (2005) manual alludes with this passage to the general lack of 
“interests” in these small wars: “While the interests of great powers are not immediately at stake, although 
it is certainly possible that a small war unsuccessfully prosecuted could lead to a more serious situation 
where survival or vital interests do become involved …” (p. 6). 
8 Of interest here is that the Army’s manual of definitions does not list or define the term special 
forces. The Joint Publication, cited here, provides this definition. 
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Weinberger Doctrine: In 1984, U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger 
delivered a speech to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on how the U.S. 
military should be used. Figure 1 list the points that came from his speech and which later 
became known as the Weinberger Doctrine. This doctrine is still the referred to in 2005 
as the criteria for sending U.S. troops into a conflict.  
(1) …the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular 
engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.   
(2) …if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should 
do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.  
(3) …if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly 
defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces 
can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces 
needed to do just that.  
(4) …the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed – their 
size, composition and disposition – must be continually reassessed and adjusted if 
necessary. 
(5) … before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable 
assurance we will have the support of the American People and their elected 
representatives in Congress.   
(6) … the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.  
 
Table 1. Weinberger Doctrine.  (From Weinberger, 1990, pp. 441-442). 
 
The most significant point of the Weinberger Doctrine relative to this thesis is that 
the U.S. military should not be committed to a conflict “unless the vital national interests 
of the United States or its allies are involved.”  
United States Vital National Interests: Establishing what the U.S. vital national 
interests are is a difficult task. There is not an official list that exists and what is 
considered “vital” changes with the times. The current National Security Strategy (2002) 
lists several interests to the U.S., but does not label the importance of those interests. 
However, when President George W. Bush states in the National Security Strategy that 
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“Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of 
the Federal Government,” one can derive that this is a vital national interest. For a 
slightly expanded explanation of U.S. vital national interests, General Henry H. Shelton, 
who at the time was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave a speech to the Kennedy 
School of Government/Harvard University on January 19, 2000, which provides a 
generally accepted explanation for U.S. vital national interests: “…by vital interests, I 
mean the big things that directly impact the survival of the Republic and our way of life – 
such as the safety of American citizens abroad, the security of our territory or that of our 
allies, and protection of our economic well being….” 
Unconventional Warfare (UW):  
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of 
long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or 
surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and 
directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not 
limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, 
and unconventional assisted recovery (JP 1-02, 2004, p. 554).  
The reason this term is not used in favor of the term “small war” is because the 
Special Forces-led PMF model does not necessarily include subversion and sabotage. In 
fact, the model could be used in support of a humanitarian assistance mission, which 
seems to depart from the term “UW” but can fall within the scope of a “small wars” if the 
humanitarian assistance is provided during a conflict.  
C. SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
There are few books written on the subject of hiring PMCs. The most prominent 
book is by P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military 
Industry. This is an excellent academic work that is truly relevant to the world’s current 
events. The book’s only deficiency is that it does not have a rival that might present 
conflicting opinions. It is considered by many to be the premier work in the field of 
military outsourcing. In fact, one finds it difficult to read a news or academic article 
about PMCs without Singer’s book being referenced. There are other books on the 
subject, most notably by Jim R. Davis and Ken Silverstein, but these books have not 
received the notoriety of Singer’s book.   
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Although there are not many books on the subject, the availability of news and 
academic articles is a different matter. There have been articles written on the subject of 
PMCs in such prominent journals as Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces Journal, and 
Parameters. Articles have also been published in news magazines like Time, U.S. News 
and World Report, and Newsweek. The New York Times and Los Angeles Times have also 
published several articles on PMCs.  
Most of the material available on the subject of PMCs generally falls into one of 
two groups – those written by authors who do not favor the PMI and those by authors 
who do. The ones who do not favor the PMI view outsourcing, contracting, or hiring 
PMCs as simply euphemistic for employing mercenaries and, therefore, not a good 
practice. State leaders within the African Union (AU), formally known as the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), generally take this stance, which is not surprising 
since mercenaries have a checkered history on the African Continent. When the literature 
from this group is published, it usually discusses the destabilizing effects of mercenaries 
and the mercenaries’ general lack of accountability in the international arena. The ones 
who favor the PMI view today’s outsourcing as something very different from the days of 
mercenaries. This group largely supports the use of PMCs and sees the employment of 
these organizations as a potentially good idea. This group is not necessarily unanimous 
on the subject; in fact, many of them add a caveat to their work addressing the need for 
more regulation of the PMI.  
Both groups have a significant number of supporters that give good arguments 
both for and against outsourcing. One cautionary note when researching the PMI, there 
are some books on the market that read like exciting fictitious mercenary novels. 
Although the role of mercenaries is an integral part of the PMI, these “mercenary” books 
should not be used for more than a supplement to any research on the subject.  
D. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter II: The Precedence for U.S. Outsourcing  
Chapter II serves a two-fold purpose: first, to establish an historic precedence for 
the U.S. to employ forces, other than the U.S. military, to fight, or help fight, a war. This 
precedence includes guerrilla warfare, insurgencies, the use of mercenaries, and most 
recently, the employment of PMCs. The second purpose is to establish that all of these 
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terms can fall under one heading within current U.S. military doctrine – surrogate 
warfare. The U.S. military has one organization suited to conduct surrogate warfare – the 
Special Forces.   
2.  Chapter III: Trusting PMCs 
Chapter III addresses several of the risks involved with hiring PMCs and how 
those risks can be mitigated. Although all the risks associated with outsourcing are not 
mentioned, the most significant ones for the subject are discussed within this chapter. 
After analyzing the risk mitigations, one is drawn to the conclusion that PMCs can be 
trusted in some circumstances if the environment is right.   
3. Chapter IV: Outsourcing Legalities 
Chapter IV covers the international and domestic laws that govern mercenary 
activity. Mercenary activity is analyzed because the PMI has to operate in light of this 
association and mercenarism cannot be removed from the subject of PMCs. This chapter 
also covers USG contracting and the legal controls the United States has over contractors.  
4.  Chapter V: A Special Forces-led PMF Model 
Chapter V contains the recommendation of this thesis. Here is where the thesis 
statement becomes a usable product. A model is created that has a Special Forces element 
managing a surrogate force, specifically, PMCs. The model addresses the “trust” 
concerns presented in Chapter III and operates within the legal framework described in 
Chapter IV.     
5.  Chapter VI: Conclusion 
Chapter VI simply reviews and summarizes the ideas set forth in the thesis.   
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II. THE PRECEDENCE FOR U.S. OUTSOURCING 
[King George III of England] is at this time transporting large Armies of 
foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and 
tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty and perfidy scarcely 
paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a 
civilized nation. – Declaration of Independence, 1776  
As can be seen above by a section taken from the American Declaration of 
Independence (1776), as least 55 of the founding fathers for the United States of America 
shared a negative opinion of mercenaries. This attitude could have been born out of a true 
dislike for those who fight wars for countries other than their own, or it could have 
simply been part of the propaganda needed “toward galvanizing American public opinion 
against the British crown ….” (Fawcett, 1999, p. 44). Regardless of the reason, as the 
U.S. grew and developed over the years as a country, its national interests grew as well. 
Several times since the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. has had interests 
somewhere other than on American soil that required supplemental troops for the U.S. 
forces in order to affect those interests. The United States addressed these “interest 
issues” the same way the British did in 1776 – the United States got some help.  
This chapter is designed to serve two purposes: first, it will provide a historical 
context by which the United States has addressed or implemented some type of 
outsourcing to conduct military operations; second, it will explain how these 
implementations translate as surrogate warfare, which falls under the U.S. military 
doctrinal heading of UW and should be conducted by Special Forces. Although the intent 
of this chapter is not to distinguish between different labels of surrogate forces, e.g. allied 
forces and indigenous personnel, inevitably this evaluation occurs. Finally, one can see 
that the use of PMCs is simply another means of employing surrogate forces. Therefore, 
hiring PMCs can become just another form of UW.  
The following cases are deliberately short and meant as an overview of the 
subject. Only the facts relevant to the discussion of outsourcing or surrogate warfare are 
discussed. The cases are not designed as an all inclusive list, but, instead, as varying 
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examples of the U.S. experience with outsourcing. Further investigation into any of the 
cases can be done by searching the “References” section of this thesis.  
A. U.S. HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT WITH OUTSOURCING 
1. Revolutionary America 
In 1776, England arranged for and sent German troops to its rebelling American 
Colonies to supplement their inadequate force.9 As a result of this arrangement, the 
Germans received the label as mercenaries. The Germans had to be used because King 
George III of England realized that he did not have the forces available to suppress a 
rebellion in the American Colonies, so he had to look elsewhere for forces. Not 
surprisingly, King George III, a descendent of the German Hanover line of monarchs, 
sought help from the various small German states at the time. These states had surplus 
armies from the Seven Years War that needed employment, so thirty thousand of them 
joined the British ranks for a fee (Forstchen, 1999). The opening quote to this chapter 
expresses how the Continental Congress thought about “mercenaries” being sent to 
America to fight for the British. The Germans were clearly surrogate forces, but were 
they really mercenaries?  
Even though money exchanged hands, does that necessarily mean the Hessians 
deserved the label of mercenary? The German states existed as acknowledged entities 
with armies. One could interpret the German support as simply states supportive of the 
British crown providing troops for combat. The fact that these German states received 
financial compensation does not necessarily mean they were mercenaries. If the 
Continental Army truly did have reservations about “mercenaries,” then it probably 
would not have contracted Baron Frederick William Augustus Von Stueben, a Prussian 
officer, to train the army at Valley Forge (Singer, 2003, p. 33). One only needs to look at 
recent examples of how one country had to pay for another allied country’s support to 
fight a war.10
 
9 These troops have been historically labeled “Hessians.” In actuality, the Hessians made up only a 
portion of the German contingent, albeit the largest portion.  
10 This comment is referring to the situation in Turkey during the U.S. build-up for the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003. Turkey sought somewhere between $14 billion to $25 billion from the United States, a fellow 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, in order for the United States to use Turkey as a 
staging base into Iraq. Although Turkey is an ally of the United States, it still demanded financial payment 
for military support (Slevin, 2003, February 14). 
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This case is obviously not an example of U.S. outsourcing; rather it is a British 
example. Nonetheless, the Germans during the Revolutionary War constituted the first 
exposure that America, as a declared independent state, had with outsourcing. Also, the 
German employment illustrates the point that how surrogate forces are labeled is largely 
a matter of opinion and not fact. A mercenary is a surrogate soldier, but a surrogate 
soldier is not necessarily a mercenary.   
2. China 
In 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt maintained a posture of not getting 
involved with foreign wars; however, the speed of which the Japanese moved through 
Asia concerned him. During that time, Claire Chennault, an American from Louisiana, 
served as an advisor and trainer to the Chinese Air Force and a group of international 
mercenary fliers (who were at varying competency and quality levels). He went to 
Washington D.C. to get support from the USG. Roosevelt maintained his public 
neutrality stance but wanted to support China as long as it was done “… with utmost 
discretion and without creating a political uproar” (Roberts, 1999, p. 132). On April 14, 
1941, the American Volunteer Group (AVG), better known as the Flying Tigers, stood-
up under a bogus private business and U.S. military flyers were allowed to leave the 
service and serve in this unit for a one year tour, then return to the U.S. military upon 
completion of their tour. The Flying Tigers fought for the Chinese while simultaneously 
serving U.S. interests.  
This case shows that because of the threat of a negative domestic or international 
response, the U.S. found a way to help another country without sending its own troops. 
Since the Flying Tigers were not in the service while flying in China, some might view 
them as American mercenaries. However, even though they did serve as surrogate pilots 
for the Chinese, they clearly were not mercenaries since they were sent by the USG and 
supported U.S. interests in Asia.  
A key word Roosevelt used to describe the mission was “discretion.” The word 
choice suggests something different from the word “covert.” The next case illustrates the 




In 1961, the United States had a strong desire to remove Fidel Castro from power, 
but did not want the removal to be conducted by U.S. forces. So the United States found 
what seemed to be a viable alternative – Cuban exiles. These exiles were recruited into a 
fourteen hundred man invasion force named “the Brigade” by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and trained in Guatemala for an impending covert invasion of Cuba. 
Because of the size of the Brigade and the recruiting of Cuban exiles in Florida, the press 
discovered and reported on the operation. Nonetheless, President John F. Kennedy’s took 
the position that U.S. forces would have little to no involvement with the operation and 
the “use of the exile brigade would make possible the toppling of Castro without actual 
aggression by the United States” (Janis, 1982, p. 15).  
The Bay of Pigs event illustrates a large-scale example of how the U.S. has been 
willing to use others to prosecute vital U.S. foreign policy when U.S. forces may have 
served better. This case also shows how indigenous forces can summarily be labeled as 
mercenaries when these fighters actually fall into the category of insurgents. The reason 
is that although these forces were clearly surrogates for the USG, they were Cubans who 
were fighting for Cuba. This characteristic alone sets them apart from mercenaries. With 
the exception of some CIA advisors, the force actually consisted of mostly, if not solely, 
Cuban exiles. So, in actuality, the Brigade fought in their country to retake their country, 
which eliminates them from being mercenaries but clearly keeps them within the realm of 
a surrogate force. So, should a surrogate force have been used?  
The USG wanted Castro removed from power to eliminate a Communist threat 
within the United States’ sphere of influence. This could easily have been considered a 
U.S. vital national interest at the time and probably should have had a greater U.S. 
military involvement. Although there were some U.S. agents among the Brigade, there 
were not enough of them, and the planned naval support was only limited. During the 
course of planning for the operation, noted Kennedy Administration historian Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. noted that “somehow the idea took hold around the cabinet table that this 
[operation] would not much matter so long as United States soldiers did not take part in 
the actual fighting” (Janis, 1982, p. 20). The U.S. might have served itself better by either 
employing a U.S. force with limited indigenous support or fully supporting the Brigade 
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with the assets it needed to be victorious. In the end, the operations failed and tainted the 
future U.S. perception of surrogate warfare.  
4. Croatia   
During the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, Serbia remained too powerful 
and aggressive against its neighbors and former countrymen, so the U.S. wanted to offset 
Serbian hegemony with a balance of power. However, the U.S. could not directly support 
any one of the individual countries involved with the ongoing conflict because of a U.N. 
arms embargo against all of the countries involved.11 So, in order to affect the situation in 
one of the new countries, the U.S. recommended that Croatia hire Military Professional 
Resources Incorporated (MPRI) to conduct training of their military, which also fell 
under the embargo. MPRI designed a long-range management program and training on 
“democratic principles and civil-military relations to officers previously accustomed to 
the Soviet model of organization” (Singer, 2003, p. 126). MPRI received a license from 
the State Department for this contract, and by early 1995 MPRI, was in full 
implementation of their contract. In August of 1995, the Croats launched an 
overwhelmingly successful operation named OPERATION STORM. MPRI denied any 
involvement with the operation but outside observers believe that the combined arms 
coordination was uncharacteristic for a military that had just recently formed from a 
militia. Also, the plan looked like a text book operation characteristic of “the U.S. 
Army’s Air-Land 2000 doctrine that the firm was expert in” (Singer, 2003, p. 127). Most 
outside observers believe that the company’s influence, no matter how direct, is the 
reason the mission succeeded (Singer, 2003).   
MPRI falls into the category of surrogate forces for the USG because they were 
employed to serve U.S. interests when U.S. forces were not able or willing to be used. 
This company, by any definition, did not serve as mercenaries because its employees 
only served in an advisory role and did not engage in combat operations. Also, because of 
the training of indigenous forces, MPRI’s operations fall into the category of UW.  
MPRI claims it is “distinguished by its professionalism and loyalty to U.S. foreign 
policy goals” (Singer, 2003, p. 119). This claim is also one of the major criticisms of 
 
11 The USG actually supported this arms embargo in the U.N. Security Council, so going directly 
against it would seem hypocritical.  
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MPRI. That criticism is that MPRI is simply an extension of the U.S. military, which 
some view as a way for the USG to “get around” laws, or, in the Croatian case, a U.N. 
arms embargo. This may be true; MPRI may be a good work-around, but nonetheless, 
they helped a fledgling country when no one else would or could.  
5. Afghanistan 
As Afghanistan relates to U.S. foreign policy, it clearly has two distinct time 
periods that need to be briefly addressed. The first occurred during the Soviet invasion in 
the 1980’s. This is when the U.S. supported the Mujahdeen by way of waging a proxy 
war against the Soviet Union. This was clearly the U.S. using surrogate forces to engage 
an enemy without becoming involved itself.  
The second period that the U.S. became involved in Afghanistan was in October 
2001, just after the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda attack on the United States. This is a 
case where the Special Forces infiltrated the sovereign nation of Afghanistan in October 
2001 to train and advise the Northern Alliance in the fight against the Taliban. The 
Northern Alliance consisted largely of a mixture of non-Pastun minority tribes in the 
northern region of Afghanistan (Ricks & Loeb, 2001). The Special Forces conducted a 
classic UW mission with the emphasis being “by, with, and through” the indigenous 
population. The Northern Alliance clearly consisted of Afghan fighters fighting for a new 
Afghanistan, which places them in the category of indigenous forces. Again, they were 
also surrogate forces for the U.S. One of the main differences between the Cuban “Bay of 
Pigs” Brigade and the Afghan Northern Alliance is that the Brigade trained abroad and 
then invaded Cuba while the Northern Alliance already controlled some of the country, 
but had to conquer the rest. One would be hard pressed to find a description of the 
Northern Alliance as mercenaries for the United States. Had the Special Forces recruited, 
trained, and fought with, for example, Pakistani fighters not officially provided by the 
Pakistani government, then these soldiers most likely would have been referred to as not 
only surrogate forces but probably also as mercenaries.    
The recent events in Afghanistan serve another purpose for this thesis, that of 
identifying a fraud. This is the case of Jonathan Keith ‘Jack’ Idema. Idema claims to have 
been working for the USG as an independent contractor, which the U.S. denies and this is 
a claim that has never been proven. On July 5, 2004, Idema, two other Americans and 
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four Afghans were arrested for running a private jail in the basement of a house in Kabul, 
Afghanistan (Meo, 2004). Coincidentally, at the time of his arrest, Idema was also 
involved with a $130 million lawsuit claiming that he was the inspiration for George 
Clooney’s character in the action thriller “The Peacemaker” and he was not compensated 
(Meo, 2004). Additionally, Idema had a lengthy arrest record before Afghanistan that 
ranged from assault and resisting arrest to impersonating a police officer and 55 federal 
wire-fraud counts. During the wire-fraud case, Idema argued that he was being 
prosecuted because he knew “national secrets” (Barry & Matthews, 2004). Idema’s antics 
probably can lead most observers to realize that he most likely was not a USG contractor 
but rather someone who fancied himself as a “secret agent” for the United States. He was 
neither an indigenous soldier, surrogate for the United States, nor an employee of a 
recognized PMC; therefore he was most likely just a free-lance12 bounty hunter out for 
the money on Osama bin Laden’s head. Unfortunately, as one private contractor 
admitted, the Idema incident may create a negative perception of legitimate PMCs 
(North, 2004). Therefore, the Idema case serves as a caution for those who would employ 
PMCs in the future to be careful of who is available for employment. 
6.  Iraq13  
The U.S. liberation of Iraq, which started in March 2003, illustrates the 
importance of outsourcing and the need for a viable PMI. After the initial military victory 
in Iraq, the United States found that it did not have enough forces to conduct all of the 
necessary operations needed for nation-building. Also, there was a distinct lack of 
coalition forces to help the United States, so the United States had to turn towards another 
source. Of course, that source was the PMI. Today in Iraq there are an estimated 15,000 
to 20,000 contractors who work for PMCs (Singer, 2004a). PMCs account for the second 
largest security contribution in Iraq with the U.S. being the largest contributor 
(Berkowitz, 2004). These PMCs conduct nearly every operation that the military could 
want or need, from cooking food to guarding convoys. Although the PMCs could still be 
 
12 The term “free-lance” originated post-bellum to the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) when out-of-
work soldiers formed “free companies” and searched for battles to fight for those who could afford their fee 
(Singer, 2003).   
13 PMC examples from Iraq will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis; therefore, this section 
will not address them at length.   
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considered a type of surrogate force, like indigenous personnel, allies, or mercenaries, 
that does not necessarily mean these companies’ operations fall into the realm of UW.   
B. SPECIAL FORCES MANAGING SURROGATE FORCES  
If all PMCs can be considered surrogate forces and the use of surrogates falls 
under the category of UW and is conducted by Special Forces, then should Special 
Forces manage all PMCs regardless of the environment? The answer to this question is 
“no.” Special Forces have a specific purpose and that purpose is to conduct UW. This 
thesis only argues that Special Forces should manage contractors as these contractors 
apply to small wars, which is close, if not synonymous, with UW. 
An SFODA is designed to train and advise up to a battalion strength of indigenous 
forces in a UW environment (FM 3-05.20, 2001). The conditions for the Special Forces 
with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan constituted a UW environment. A battalion 
consist of around 600 personnel, so if this figure can be directly translated to a surrogate 
force in the form of a PMC, then an SFODA should, by doctrine,  be able to manage 
around 600 PMC employees. Subsequently, a Special Forces Operational Detachment – 
Bravo (ODB),14 supervising six SFODAs should be able to manage a private force of 
around 3600 personnel.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The six cases provided in this chapter vary from indigenous personnel to allied 
support to PMCs, but what all these cases have in common is that, to some degree, they 
all reflect a use of “surrogate forces.” How surrogate forces are labeled is as much a 
matter of opinion as whether an organization or person is labeled a mercenary. 
Nonetheless, Special Forces are uniquely suited to manage surrogate forces under the 
right conditions – that of a small war or UW environment.  
This chapter did not cover the entire U.S. history for the employment of 
surrogates to fight in conflicts. There are other examples of surrogates such as the use of 
Montagnards and Nungs during the Vietnam War (1965-1975). Instead, this chapter 
described a variety of situations that indicate that a successful and effective precedence 
had been set for the U.S. to outsource its military and national interests in conflicts.   
 
14 The ODB is the company headquarters for six ODAs.  
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III.  TRUSTING PMCS 
The Pentagon will be unable to exploit the capacity of the private sector if 
doubts persist about the efficacy and legitimacy of contractor support. In 
any private sector activity, people understand the marketplace and make 
smart decisions when there is transparency. Security services are no 
different. Companies providing contractor support must help build trust 
and confidence in their services. They must establish best practices and 
professional standards--measures by which their actions should be judged. 
– James Carafano, 2005   
The previous chapter discussed the U.S. historical precedence for the use of 
surrogate forces and categorized PMCs as a type of surrogate force. However, just 
because there is precedence for outsourcing does not necessarily mean that the U.S. 
should trust surrogate forces, in this case, PMCs. Can these PMCs be trusted as much as 
U.S. service members? More specifically, can the USG trust PMCs to help fight and win 
its nation’s wars?   
This chapter explores the most critical risks involved with hiring PMCs and if 
those risks can be mitigated. This is done to determine if PMCs can be trusted to help 
fight U.S. wars. Several non-U.S. examples are used to cover as many risks as possible. 
The framework to determine if trust can exist is derived from Piotr Sztompka’s (1999) 
book, Trust: A Sociological Theory. Trust is defined as the following: the reliance on the 
integrity, capability, and strength of someone or something to make a bet on a future act 
(pp. 25-26).  
A. RESPONSIVE TRUST 
The type of trust that applies to the outsourcing of war, as described by Sztompka 
(1999), is responsive trust. The U.S. places something valuable – military operations – in 
the control of a PMC and trusts the PMC to conduct operations appropriately. There are 
several examples of this. MPRI is trusted by the United States to train part of the future 
military officer corps by contracting to fill desperately needed Reserve Officer Training 
Corps (ROTC) cadre positions at universities across the country. Kellogg, Brown, and 
Root (KBR) is trusted to run several base camps, which look more like small cities, in 
Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In February 1995, with the insurgent group RUF within 
fifty miles of Freetown (the capital) and without any other nation willing to commit 
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troops, the Sierra Leone government hired EO to regain control of not only its diamond 
mines, but its country as well. Had EO failed, the country would have most likely fallen 
to the RUF (Singer, 2003). These examples indicate only a few situations where PMCs 
are being or have been trusted. The basis for this trust is not random and depends on 
several factors.  
Sztompka (1999) identifies two grounds for trust, primary and secondary trust, 
which are applicable to understanding whether the U.S. can trust PMCs. Primary trust, or 
reflected trustworthiness, is how one estimates the trustworthiness of someone or 
something through the traits that the recipient possesses. The key to primary trust is in 
possessing a trait. Sztompka categorizes reputation, performance, and appearance under 
primary trust. Secondary trust, or derived trustworthiness, is the external affects that 
create an environment that is structurally conducive to trust. Militarily speaking, through 
control measures one could reasonably believe that the potential recipient of trust can, in 
fact, be trusted. The categories for secondary trust are accountability, pre-commitment, 
and trust-inducing situations (pp. 69-71).   
1. Primary Trust 
The first category under primary trust is reputation. A PMC’s reputation is 
probably the single most important factor that is evaluated to determine if it is 
trustworthy or not. The USG has to be careful to critically research a would-be contracted 
PMC to ensure that the PMC has a history of accomplishing its missions, does not have a 
record of human rights violations, does not employ questionable or previously criminal 
employees, and has an established record that indicates longevity. Similar to longevity, 
the U.S. must ensure that the PMC in question is not merely the resurrection of a bad 
PMC under a different name.  
Back to the Sierra Leone example: in 1995 the government hired EO based off of 
its established reputation in Angola of achieving a quick and resounding victory over the 
insurgents. The Sierra Leone government trusted EO simply based on its established 
record of success. The U.S. similarly trusts MPRI and KBR because of their established 
reputations as well. Both companies have a long and almost dependent history of loyally 
serving the USG. Conversely, if a company does not establish a good reputation, it might 
not enjoy the fruits of future, lucrative contracts. EO was hired in Sierra Leone to replace 
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the Gurkha Security Group (GSG) when GSG lost its commander, Bob McKenzie (an 
American mercenary of the Rhodesian War fame) who was captured, killed, and eaten by 
the RUF as a warning to other interlopers. GSG subsequently broke its contract and fled 
Sierra Leone (Singer, 2003, p. 112). It is reasonable to say that this company, although 
still in existence as of 2005, will neither receive critical nor valuable contracts again. The 
building blocks for a PMC’s reputation are its actual performance.    
Performance is the second category under primary trust. The performance of a 
PMC lays the foundation for its reputation. As of 2005, there are at least 60 PMCs 
working in Iraq (Singer, 2004). Some work for the USG and some work for other 
countries or companies. The significance of this is that how these PMCs perform will set 
the stage for their future employment. If a given PMC is accomplishing its missions 
within the boundaries of its contract, then the PMC will probably enjoy future contracts 
as well. The opposite of this is true as well. The alleged wrong-doings by some PMCs 
have indicated poor performance. CusterBattles is accused of overcharging the USG, 
Vinnell Corporation did an unsatisfactory job training the Iraqi military; and CACI 
International provided some of the interrogators involved with the Abu Ghraib prison 
torture scandal (Boot, 2005b). These mishaps have probably damaged these companies’ 
images for sometime to come and future contracts may be awarded to their competitors. 
These scandals represent a less-than-professional performance and appearance that taints 
not only the individual PMC, but the entire PMI as well.     
Appearance is the final trait that Sztompka (1999) categorizes under primary trust. 
A search of PMCs on the World Wide Web reveals a host of web pages that are 
professionally created and managed (see Appendix B for examples). Business legitimacy 
is gained through such efforts, a “dress for success” mentality. But also under the topic of 
appearance is what not to look like, and that would mean not to look like a mercenary 
company. Mercenarism is not only generally considered illegal in international law, but 
having mercenaries in the employment of a country tends to de-legitimize any cause as 
can be seen in the Papa New Guinea case.  
In 1997, the Prime Minister Julius Chan of the Papa New Guinea government 
hired Sandline, a British PMC, to quell a rebellion on the island of Bougainville. Neither 
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the country’s parliament nor its military was consulted. Both organizations unanimously 
rejected the idea of hiring what they considered to be mercenaries to solve a domestic 
problem. The military wanted the money earmarked for Sandline to go to new equipment 
and training. The result was that the Prime Minister was forced to resign and Sandline did 
not fulfill its contract (Singer, 2003, pp. 192-195). Insomuch as the Sandline incident 
may not seem applicable to the U.S., the Idema case clearly is.  
Reflecting back to the Idema case, he was arrested in Kabul, Afghanistan for 
running a private jail in the basement of his house. Upon his arrest, he claimed to be 
working with the consent of, if not for, the USG. The USG denied any relationship with 
Idema (Barry, 2004). It appears that Idema was just an opportunist (with a significant 
criminal record) hunting for the bounty on suspected terrorists, but his story is the exact 
situation with which modern-day PMCs desperately want to avoid association. Even if 
Idema was under contract, he most likely strayed from that contract, which would have 
led to pecuniary or criminal penalties anyway. Contracts are part of the accountability 
measures taken to control the conduct of a PMC. 
2. Secondary Trust 
Sztompka (1999) characterizes accountability under secondary trust. The 
accountability of a PMC is primarily managed through a contract, with associated 
contract procedures, which the USG engages. The contract will be discussed in more 
detail in the “Functional Substitutes for Trust” section.  
Another trait under secondary trust that involves the contract is pre-commitment 
trust. This would occur when a PMC accepts upfront heavy penalties written into a 
contract if the PMC only partially completes a given mission or violates the boundaries of 
the contract. For the USG, this pre-commitment is probably an indicator that the PMC is 
confident in its abilities and probably trustworthy in its deeds. If a PMC is not willing to 
accept the pre-commitment conditions, then the U.S. might want to search elsewhere for 
outsourcing.  
A trust-inducing situation is the last trait found in Sztompka’s (1999) secondary 
trust. Translating this concept to PMCs would mean asking if the PMC will perform the 
same as a military unit under combat conditions? An example of this occurred in April 
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2004, in Najaf, Iraq, when eight Blackwater USA employees along with a few U.S. Army 
Military Policemen and a Marine, defended the U.S. headquarters for several hours 
before being relieved by the U.S. military. Blackwater USA also used its helicopters to 
re-supply the beleaguered warriors and medically evacuate the eventually wounded 
Marine. None of these missions were in the original Blackwater USA contract but were 
performed superbly, nonetheless (Priest, 2004). Because of this event, it can probably be 
assumed that the U.S. forces in the Najaf area completely trust Blackwater USA in 
combat.  
B. PRUDENT VS. IMPRUDENT RISKS 
Sztompka (1999) compares the degree of trust to the value of the stakes at hand in 
order to determine prudence of a risk (p. 33). To make the decision whether to hire a 
PMC or not largely depends on the risk tolerance of the U.S. Are the risks of hiring a 
PMC worth the gains? Employing PMCs allow “… the United States to pursue its 
geopolitical interest without deploying its own army …” (Silverstein, 2000, p. 145). If 
this concept is important to the political and military leadership, then the risks are clearly 
worth the gains, but, of course, that does not mean that the risks cannot be mitigated 
through effective control measures.  
Since hiring PMCs may involve risking U.S. service members’ well-being or, 
more importantly, their lives, it is reasonable to assume that if a PMC is hired, actions 
will be taken by the USG to ensure the PMC performs its intended contract. These 
actions take the form of some type of control measures that are integrated into the 
contract. Sztompka (1999) realizes the necessity of control when he advocates that 
effective businesses implement control measures to mitigate the possible or potential 
violation of trust for a future act (p. 57). Before these mitigations are addressed, one must 
understand some of the risks involved with hiring PMCs. By assessing the value of these 
risks, the U.S. can more effectively evaluate the degree of trust that must be given to hire 






                                                
C. ASSUMING RISKS 
As discussed above, by hiring and trusting a PMC, the U.S. assumes a huge risk. 
If a PMC does not conduct itself appropriately or fails to accomplish the contracted 
mission, then the U.S. has to potentially pay the price financially, morally, and with a 
damaged public reputation. The following section of this chapter will describe some of 
the risks involved with hiring PMCs. Since hiring a PMC does not involve “blind trust”, 
the last section of this chapter will discuss the mitigations of those risks.  
One of the major concerns with hiring a PMC is whether the PMC will stay in the 
combat zone if the PMC judges that the environment becomes too hazardous for the pay. 
As discussed in the “reputation” section of this essay, the Sierra Leone government 
experienced this firsthand in 1995 when they hired GSG to train and assist its army in the 
fight against the RUF. This case illustrates that at least one PMC is willing to break a 
contract if the going gets too tough, but, what does this mean to the U.S.? Perhaps 
nothing; there are not any examples of PMCs pulling out of Iraq, Afghanistan, or Bosnia, 
which are major U.S. involvements that employ PMCs. Of course, this does not mean 
that it could not happen to the USG.15  
Another risk is the commission of human rights violations. During EO’s time in 
Sierra Leone, their members were accused of serious human rights violations. Some have 
argued that EO’s success largely relied on these violations and that if EO had to follow 
stricter Rules of Engagement (ROE), then they would not have been as successful 
(Douglas, 1999, pp. 195-196). Although EO may have committed human rights 
violations, the fact remains such violations are not uncommon among national forces as 
well, and soon after EO left Sierra Leone, the government crumbled and chaos ensued. 
Nigeria deployed elements of its military under the ECOMOG to bring order and stability 
back to Sierra Leone. During the Nigerians’ engagements, they too were also accused of 
human rights violations. It seems that “[m]any armed forces and governments are no  
 
15 That being stated, Contrack International Inc., a private construction company that had a contract to 
rebuild Iraq’s transportation systems, did prematurely pull out of Iraq in late 2004 because the company’s 
management believed “it was too dangerous to stay” (Dangers, 2004, December 22). However, this is a 
company created and employed to conduct civilian construction for civilian government employment and 
does not fit this thesis’ definition of a PMC.  
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more accountable than are PMCs” (Leander, 2003, p. 8). The mere fact that a force is 
contracted instead of a national military does not mean that human rights violations will 
or will not occur. 
Yet another risk occurs when PMCs start taking over critical military functions 
that, if not performed, would cause considerable hardship on operations. Canada 
contracted a PMC to move Canadian military troops, equipment, and arms from Bosnia 
back to Canada. A contract dispute occurred between two of the sub-contractors and the 
ships refused to deliver the cargo. Subsequently, one-third of the Canadian military was 
held hostage at sea for two weeks until the situation was resolved (Singer, 2003, p. 160). 
This event could have probably been dealt with better by the Canadian government as 
will be described in the next section.  
While PMCs focus on their economic bottom-line, just like normal businesses, the 
United States is concerned with accomplishing its strategic and military goals. Is there a 
potential conflict of interest (Singer, 2003, p. 142)? One fear is that PMCs might prolong 
a conflict in order to stay in business. “Moreover, the market for security is one where 
suppliers tend to create their demand” (Leander, 2003, p. 9). One might argue that this is 
a very natural business move in the open market; for example, if someone develops and 
markets a product, then that person wants to support or create conditions for the product 
to survive and grow in the economy. However, this being stated, there are not any recent 
cases, at least since the end of the Cold War, of a PMC “prolonging the war.” On the 
contrary, in Angola, President dos Santos halted the EO advance on Jonas Savimbi’s 
insurgent group, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), which 
would have, arguably, crushed the insurgents. The result was continued fighting to this 
day, even after Savimbi’s death. Another example is President Kabbah of Sierra Leone 
ordered EO not to destroy the ruminants of the RUF leadership in their mountain hideout. 
The result was that Kabbah was ousted within 100 days of EO’s departure. It appears 
that, at least recently, PMCs have been willing to end conflicts swiftly. This makes good 
business sense, not only because a PMC can begin to get ready for its next assignment, 
but, because a well written contract would reward early deadlines being met. As will be 
discussed, the contract is the guiding document by which to control PMCs (Singer, 2003).   
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These above risks are potentially lethal in nature if not mitigated in some way. 
Since it has already been established that “blind trust” does not have a role in trusting 
PMCs, the substitutes, or maybe enhancements, for trust must be acceptable to the U.S. 
These substitutes take the form of control measures. 
D. FUNCTIONAL SUBSTITUTES FOR TRUST = CONTROL 
Overgrowth of vigilance and excessive litigiousness are the two pertinent 
functional substitutes for trust that Sztompka (1999) identifies. Both of these factors are 
absorbed by a well-written contract that could be enforced by the USG. Also, the risks of 
hiring PMCs are mitigated in a contextual manner by the mere legitimacy of PMCs that 
are “slaves to the market.”   
The detailed drafting of a contract and subsequent monitoring provides the 
essential control over outsourcing. PMCs are not “fire-and-forget” weapons and must be 
effectively supervised. In the 17th and 18th Centuries, mercenary forces fought under a 
“condatto” or contract that was created and controlled by the hiring entity (Jefferies, 
2000, p. 2). The same holds true today. The regulating force for the PMC is whichever 
agency within the USG contracts the operation. That agency is the responsible body that 
writes the Statement of Work (SOW) with clear tasks and conditions to be met, i.e. a 
timeline and a manner in which to conduct the mission. That agency has within it the 
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) who assigns appropriate Contracting Officer 
Representatives (COR) to monitor the execution of the contract. If the contractor has a 
“failure to perform,” then two basic recourses can be taken. The first recourse, if it is a 
minor failure, is that the contractor can be fined or required to re-perform the failed task. 
The second recourse, if there is a major failure on the contractor’s part; is that the failure 
could result in a reduction in payment or termination for defaulting. The end result would 
most likely be the contractor being placed on the Debarred, Suspended, and Ineligible 
(DSI) list. The point for addressing the contracting issues is to demonstrate that the 
administrative procedures involved with controlling a PMC already exists in the USG 
procurement process.  
“Because [PMCs] operate with little oversight, using contractors also enables the 
military to skirt troop limits imposed by Congress and to carry out clandestine operations 
without committing U.S. troops or attracting public attention” (Yeoman, 2003). Some 
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believe that employing PMCs are just a way to get around reporting to Congress 
(Johnson, 2004, p. 142). In the case of sending U.S. troops, Congress can get answers. In 
the case of a contracting a PMC, all that is required is a license from the Department of 
State (DoS), and if the contract is under $50 million, then there is no obligation by the 
contracting agency to discuss or reveal the details of a contract with Congress 
(Silverstein, 2000, p. 167). In 2001, Aviation Development Corps worked for the CIA in 
South America and misidentified a plane as having cocaine traffickers onboard. Acting 
on this intelligence, the Peruvian Air Force shot down the plane, which was actually 
carrying civilians to include a U.S. missionary and her seven-month-old daughter. Under 
the veil of secrecy, both the CIA and DoS refused information to Congress. Rep. Jan 
Schakowsky (D-Ill.) criticized the incident because the PMCs do not have the same level 
of accountability as U.S. forces, but they are operating with U.S. consent, either tacit or 
explicit (Van Dongen, 2003). The way to solve this issue is to remove the “veils of 
secrecy” and report forthright what the CIA, Department of Defense (DoD), and/or DoS 
are doing with PMCs.16 Of course, covert operations will still take place, but some of the 
current outsourcing probably does not need to be classified in any manner. One may 
argue that the benefits of revealing to Congress the advantages of hiring a PMC over 
employing U.S. forces outweigh the tendency to hire a PMC and then playing the 
“secret” card when Congress wants answers.  
The conflict between the economic bottom-line of a business and the goals of the 
U.S. can be adjusted, if not reduced, by aligning the contract rewards with the U.S. 
interests. The contract has to be crafted carefully by the USG agency requesting the 
contract and the Contracting Officer to ensure that these interests align.  Another more 
contentious technique would be to only hire U.S.-based and operated firms. This would 
most likely mean that their employees are primarily ex-U.S. military who do not 
necessarily lose their U.S. heritage, beliefs, morals, and dedication just because they 
retire from or leave military service. According to Chris Bertelli, a Washington D.C. 
lobbyist for Blackwater USA, “There is still a deep patriotism in many of them” (Leigh, 
2004, May 17). One might be able to argue that a U.S. run and manned PMC is still an 
 
16 Congressman Price is trying to do get PMC contracts transparent to Congress. This will be 
discussed further in Chapter IV. See Appendix C for his proposed bill in full.  
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extension of the U.S. military in the sense the same people who defended the country 
before publicly are now simply doing it privately. MPRI is a good example of this. MPRI 
is uniquely staffed with ex-U.S. military flag officers who probably share the goals of the 
USG, sometimes to their detriment. MPRI has been accused of simply being an extension 
of the DoD, and this accusation has been meant as a harsh criticism (Singer, 2003, p121). 
In actuality, this comment might be a complement and, more significantly, a benefit to 
U.S. policy. The fact that MPRI seems to be well-integrated into the DoD helps to ensure 
its business objectives are the same as the U.S.’s goals and within the USG’s timeline. 
Even going back to the days of the Flying Tigers, Chennault preferred the U.S. military 
trained pilots that replaced the previous contractor pilots: “To a man, they subscribed to 
the discipline and mores of the U.S. military services” (Roberts, 1999, p. 133). 
The private industry argues that one simple control measure keeps them in the 
fight: the market. PMCs are bound by their reputations to fulfill their contract obligations 
or pay for the consequences with a loss of business. Today’s PMCs are subsidiaries to 
major and established companies, i.e. Brown and Root Services to Halliburton, MPRI to 
L3 Communications, and Vinnell to the Carlyle Group. The “slave to the market” idea is 
the same argument PMCs use to counter potential future human rights violations and 
failure to perform critical military functions (Singer, 2003, p. 217).    
Also, to prevent a critical military function failure, a contract has to be written in 
such a way as to invoke considerable financial penalties for such an action. However, and 
more importantly, the U.S. has to be willing to act, violently if necessary, if a PMC does 
not fulfill its contract. In the Canadian example, an appropriate use of force, i.e. direct 
action, could have been applied to enforce the contract obligation, and all of the 
contractors involved should have been placed on the DSI list to block future contracts. 
The DSI threat should be enough to keep even stubborn, yet established, PMCs in check 
because the private industry is in the profit-making business.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Can PMCs be trusted to help fight and win the U.S.’s wars? Partially. The U.S. 
can trust PMCs to do some things, but not others. For example, the U.S. can trust a PMC 
to guard President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan but probably not guard President Bush. 
Although it is clear that the U.S. cannot fully trust a PMC to help fight its wars, the 
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concepts presented in Sztompka’s work provide a clever analysis tool to identify where 
control measures can be implemented to compensate for the gaps in trust. This trust is 
largely based on the specific PMCs’ reputations and performance, but it is not purely 
trust because several control measures are in place to ensure that the PMCs do their jobs. 
It is the responsibility of the U.S. to place effective control measures on the PMCs to 
ensure that the PMCs perform their jobs. Although it appears that PMCs can only be 
trusted to perform certain tasks and must be controlled for others. The U.S. seems to 
already have enough control measures currently in place to employ PMCs with a certain 
degree confidence that a mission will be accomplished. This should not be a 
disappointing finding; after all, the U.S. Military places significant control measures on 
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IV. OUTSOURCING LEGALITIES 
The U.S. government has only twice as many personnel overseeing 
contractors in Iraq … as it had during the 1990’s for its Balkans contracts 
– even though there are now 15 times more contracts and the context is 
much more challenging. – Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors, 2005 
This chapter addresses the current laws and regulations governing the PMI. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the free market largely regulates the PMI, but for many 
that is not enough. The general public wants accountability for crimes, and simply firing 
a person from a PMC for a crime is not sufficient action. Peter Singer (2004b) takes the 
position that: “Felony crimes merit harsher punishment than simply the end of a good 
paycheck.” This chapter addresses the current laws and regulations governing the PMI. 
There are no international outsourcing laws except those that apply to mercenaries. This 
chapter will address the concept of mercenaries from a broader international perspective, 
then focus on contractors as it applies to the U.S. First it may be useful to address the 
relationship between PMCs and mercenaries.  
A. THE PMC AND MERCENARY RELATIONSHIPS 
There is a debate about how PMCs and mercenaries relate to one another. One 
view is that PMCs are simply modern day mercenaries; another is that PMCs are a 
legitimized evolution of mercenaries and that these terms should not be used 
interchangeably. When discussing the relationship between PMCs and mercenaries, 
David Shearer (1998) states that PMCs can be seen as “… as an effective free-market 
response to a specific need no longer met by governments and international 
organizations; on the other, they [can also be] seen as employing modern-day 
mercenaries exploiting violence for private gain” (p. 9). Shearer’s quote is a valid 
representation of how the subject of the PMI can be interpreted in two dichotomous 
ways.  
There is a common understanding regarding what a mercenary generally is – a 
person who fights for money. “In modern times, the term “mercenaries” has become a 
pejorative one, conjuring up an image of a hardened white soldier brutally intervening in 
a small, hitherto unknown African country for financial gain…” (O’Brien, 2000). 
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Generally, “conventional wisdom has it that mercenaries do not kill for polis or for 
political principle or for any other noble cause. They kill for, and are thus motivated by, 
money. For this reason, legislators confronting mercenaries cannot help but repeatedly 
point out his inherent evil” (Milliard, 2003, p. 33).  These descriptions of mercenaries 
clearly portray them as a negative attribute to the PMI. However, these descriptions do 
not necessarily describe the modern PMC employee.  
The other side of the argument states that “PMCs are not mercenaries, nor are 
they the ‘new mercenaries’ (as often referred to)…” because “they are organised along 
corporate lines (including boards of directors, share-holdings, and corporate structures), 
their work has a clear contractual aim and obligation to their clients…” (O’Brien, 2000). 
Modern PMCs differ from mercenaries of lore by incorporating into businesses instead of 
operating as individuals for individual profit. This may seem like an oversimplification of 
the differences, but this is how PMCs characterize themselves in an effort to avoid being 
called mercenaries.  
In some cases, there may not be much difference between PMCs and mercenaries. 
However, no matter what view is taken on this subject, one can see that whether PMC 
employees are mercenaries or not, largely depend on perception. Since the premise of this 
thesis is that the Special Forces-led PMF can operate within the current international and 
domestic laws, then it is important to show that PMCs can operate without being 
considered mercenaries. The rest of this chapter deals with the laws governing mercenary 
activity and government contracting.  
B. INTERNATIONAL AND NON-U.S. LAW 
The laws in this section are presented to show how mercenaries fit into the 
international comprehension of commercial military operations. None of these laws 
directly affect or are applicable to the U.S. But because the U.S. has to operate in an 
international environment, knowledge of these laws is important. There is, however, an 
indirect influence of these laws on the U.S. For example, a PMC working for the U.S. 
hires citizens from a country which has either signed one of the U.N. conventions or has 
laws in its region or country to address mercenary activity. If that is the case, then these 
employees may be in violation of some law even if the U.S. hired PMC is not. The first 
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modern attempt to develop an internationally recognized definition of a mercenary is 
Article 47 of Additional Protocol 1 (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Convention.  
1. Article 47  
Article 47 of Additional Protocol 1 (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Convention is by 
far the most commonly referred to definition of a mercenary in the international 
community. However, this article does not make being a mercenary illegal in the 
international community. Article 47 just “deprives mercenaries of the privilege to serve 
as lawful combatants and the immunity to be treated as prisoners of war upon capture” 
(Millard, 2003, p. 35). This article is a cumulative list which means all of the attributes 
have to be met for a person to be labeled as a mercenary.  
 
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war. 
2. A mercenary is any person who:  
 (a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
 conflict; 
 (b) Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
 (c) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for  private 
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation 
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in 
the armed forces of that Party; 
 (d) Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
 controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
 (e) Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
 (f) Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official 
duty as a member of its armed forces  
Table 2. Article 47 of Additional Protocol 1 (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Convention 
(From Protocol, 1977). 
 
The U.S. is not a signatory to the amendment that contains this article. 
Technically, this means the U.S. does not have to follow the definition provided. What is 
important to the USG is if a PMC hires employees who are nationals of one of the forty-
three countries that have signed to this amendment, then those individuals could be 
subject to various legal actions upon returning to their home country.  
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The reason why the U.S. has not signed to this convention is because it 
“…introduce[s] political factors that do not belong in international humanitarian law [and 
the U.S. does] not consider the provisions of article 47 to be part of current customary 
law” (Milliard, 2003, p. 37). Another issue with the definition is the difficulty of 
determining one’s motivation and relative compensation (Millard, 2003, p. 42). The 
following are some examples of these issues. Under section 2.(c), if  a person claims to 
be fighting a cause related to the conflict, he is not considered to be motivated by the “… 
desire for private gain ….” Foreign soldiers who are often labeled as mercenaries by the 
Russians, because they fight in Chechnya, might be excluded from consideration as 
mercenaries under section 2.(c) (Some 200, 2004). One can circumvent section 2.(e) by 
temporarily being instated into a country’s regular armed forces. Tim Spicer did this in 
Papa New Guinea (PNG) when he had the employees of Sandline International sworn in 
to PNG’s police force (Spicer, 1999). The Special Forces-led PMF could also avoid being 
characterized as mercenaries simply because the PMCs working for the Special Forces 
would, in fact, be sent by the USG which would eliminate either 2.(d) or 2.(f). A problem 
arises when one of the PMCs hires third party nationals, and not U.S. nor indigenous 
forces, e.g. Fijian or Chilean. The hiring of third party nationals is not a clear cut case and 
is a weakness in the model which will be further discussed in Chapter VI.  
The U.N. protocol categorizes mercenaries so that they do not receive the same 
protections provided to national armies under the 1949 Geneva Convention. Why were 
mercenaries excluded from such protections? It’s a good question. Some argued that “if 
guerillas and other classes of unconventional combatants are to be included” (Millard, 
2003, p. 38) under the 1949 Geneva Convention protection, then so should mercenaries. 
The exclusion seemed inconsistent. However, Protocol I might have “singled out 
mercenaries based on a seemingly visceral reaction towards their use during two decades 
in post-colonial Africa” (Millard, 2003, p. 38). As stated earlier, Article 47 does not make 
being a mercenary a violation of international law; however, as will be discussed next, it 
does set the model for all subsequent definitions of mercenaries and still remains the 





With the African continent experiencing a preponderant share of mercenary 
activity, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), known today as the African Union, 
wanted to stop the employment of mercenaries. Consequently, in 1985, the OAU 
convened the Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. It 
entered into force in 1985 with twenty-two of fifty-four African states having ratified it 
(Millard, 2003, p. 66).  
 
1. A mercenary is any person who: 
a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflicts; 
b) does in fact take a direct part in the hostilities; 
c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and 
in fact is promised by or on behalf of a party to the conflict material compensation; 
d) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a 
party to the conflicts; 
e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
f) is not sent by a state other than a party to the conflict on official mission as a member 
of the armed forces of the said state. 
2. The crime of mercenarism is committed by the individual, group or association, representative 
of a State or the State itself who with the aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-
determination stability or the territorial integrity of another State, practises any of the following 
acts: 
a) Shelters, organises, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, supports or in any 
manner employs bands of mercenaries; 
b) Enlists, enrols or tries to enrol in the said bands; 
c) Allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out in any territory under 
its jurisdiction or in any place under its control or affords facilities for transit, transport or other 
operations of the above mentioned forces. 
3. Any person, natural or juridical who commits the crime of mercenarism as defined in 
paragraph 1 * of this Article commits an Offence considered as a crime against peace and security 
in Africa and shall be punished as such. 
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4. A mercenary is responsible both for the Crime of mercenarism and all related offences… 
Table 3. Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. 
(1985) Excerpt. (From Convention of the OAU, 1985).  
 
This was the first effort by a political entity to criminalize mercenarism. So, 
generally speaking, if a person today is accused of being a mercenary in Africa, that 
person can be prosecuted as a criminal. While working in Africa, the U.S. must be 
cognizant of this convention in the event an African country attempts to use the 
convention to hamper U.S. operations, specifically the Special Forces-led PMF. 
However, similar to Article 47, there is the same type of definition problems that leads to 
interpretation instead of fact. Also, this regional convention had the greatest impact on 
the U.N.’s 1989 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and 
Training of Mercenaries (Millard, 2003, p. 42). 
3. 1989 U.N. Convention 
Elements from the OAU’s convention can clearly be seen in how mercenarism is 
considered a crime in and of itself. The U.N.’s International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989) attempts to make the 
act of being a mercenary not only a crime in Africa, but anywhere in the world. Only 
twenty-four of 191 member states of the U.N. have become state parties of the 
Convention, which indicates that it is not favored among most of the members of the 
U.N. (Millard, 2003, p. 66). The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989) uses Article 47’s definition for a 
mercenary but also makes the additions found in Table 4.   
The U.S. has not signed to this convention and therefore does not abide by it. 
There are not any cases of this convention being used to prosecute anyone in any type of 
international court or tribunal, e.g. International Criminal Court (ICC). However, if the 
PMI continues to grow, but does so in a way that is indicative of mercenarism, then this 





A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: 
  
     (a)  Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of 
participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at: 
  
     (i)  Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the 
          constitutional order of a State; or 
  
    (ii)  Undermining the territorial integrity of a State; 
  
     (b)  Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for 
significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material 
compensation; 
  
     (c)  Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such 
an act is directed; 
  
     (d)  Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and 
  
     (e)  Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory 
the act is undertaken. 
Table 4. Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries additions. 
(From Recruitment, 1989). 
 
4. South African Law 
Although not an internationally binding act, South Africa’s Regulation of Foreign 
Military Assistance Act (1998) has a significant impact on the PMI because many PMC 
employees come from South Africa. Of course, EO was a South African company, but 
there is also an unknown number of South Africans working in Iraq who may be 
prosecuted under this Act upon their return home (SA fighters, 2004). Unlike most 
countries, South Africa has very specific laws governing the PMI, which fall under the 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (1998). The following is an excerpt from 







(iii) ‘‘foreign military assistance’’ means military services or military-related services, or 
any attempt, encouragement, incitement or solicitation to render such services, in the form of— 
(a) military assistance to a party to the armed conflict by means of— 
(i) advice or training;  
(ii) personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence or operational support;  
(iii) personnel recruitment;  
(iv) medical or para-medical services; or  
(v) procurement of equipment;  
(b) security services for the protection of individuals involved in armed conflict or their 
property; 
(c) any action aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining the constitutional 
order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state; 
(d) any other action that has the result of furthering the military interests of a party to the 
armed conflict, but not humanitarian or civilian activities aimed at relieving the plight of civilians 
in an area of armed conflict; 
(iv) ‘‘mercenary activity’’ means direct participation as a combatant in armed conflict for 
private gain;  
(1) A person who wishes to obtain the approval of an agreement or arrangement for the 
rendering of foreign military assistance, by virtue of an authorisation referred to in section 3(b) to 
render the relevant military assistance, shall submit an application to the Committee in the 
prescribed form and manner. 
8. (1) Any person who contravenes any provision of section 2 or 3, or fails to comply 
with a condition with regard to any authorisation or approval granted in terms of section 4 or 5, 
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment or to both such 
fine and imprisonment. 
Table 5. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (1998) Excerpt (From 
Regulation, 1998).  
 
The Foreign Military Assistance Act (1998) became popular in the spring of 2005 
because of the repatriation of suspected South African mercenaries. In May of 2005, 61 
South Africans alleged mercenaries were released back to South Africa from a Harare, 
Zimbabwe prison and will be prosecuted by the South African National Prosecuting 
Authority for violating its anti-mercenary laws under the Foreign Military Assistance 
Act. The men were arrested in March 2004 for alleging plotting to overthrow the 
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Equatorial Guinea government. (61 to face, 2005, May 16). As of the writing of this 
thesis, these men were going to be prosecuted under this act.  
What does the Foreign Military Assistance Act mean to the PMI? It means that 
PMCs have to be careful when operating in and around South Africa and, more likely, the 
PMCs have to be careful when employing South Africans because, based on the 
definition of a mercenary within the Foreign Military Assistance Act (1998), these 
employees could face prosecution upon their return to South Africa.  
5. 1999 U.N. Convention 
In an effort to gain international support against mercenarism, Mr. Enrique 
Bernales Ballesteros of Peru, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Mercenary Activities, 
embedded an anti-mercenary text in The Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination and its 
Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation 
(1999). Mr. Ballesteros submitted that “…it is inadmissible for any State legally to 
authorize mercenary activities, regardless of the form they take or the objectives they 
serve. Even where legislation is lacking or deficient mercenarism is an international 
crime” (The Right of Peoples, 1999). Ballesteros went on to posit that  
… unlike mercenaries such as Colonel Bob Denard or Mike Hoare in 
Katanga during the 1960’s, today’s mercenaries do not work 
independently. They are more likely to be recruited by private companies 
offering security services and military advice and assistance, in order to 
take part or even fight in internal or international armed conflicts …. 
Mercenaries are usually, or have been, soldiers, combatants or, more 
frequently, members of special units and have experience with 
sophisticated weapons … (The Right of Peoples, 1999).  
That means that according to the U.N., all of the PMCs operating in Iraq right now for the 
U.S. are mercenaries and should be considered as criminals. There should be no wonder 
why the U.S. has not signed on to any of the U.N.’s efforts to ban mercenaries.   
C. U.S. LAWS ADDRESSING MERCENARIES  
There will be international or foreign law concerns when conducting U.S. 
outsourcing operations. However, even when outsourcing looks like hiring mercenaries, 
one can readily see how legal maneuvering can cause almost any person or entity to not 
look like a mercenary under the official U.N. definition, which bears upon both the OAU 
and South African definitions.  
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Now it is time to see the U.S. laws associated with mercenaries. There are not any 
specific laws addressing mercenaries but there are some laws that restrict U.S. military 
aid.  
The first law that addresses mercenary-type activities is the Neutrality Act of 
1794 that   
forbids U.S. citizens from taking part in military action against any 
country with which the United States is not at war. Enforcement of the act 
has been highly selective, however, with technical reasons usually offered 
for failure to prosecute. The United States has not declared war on anyone 
since World War II and has thus been legally neutral throughout such 
episodes as the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (1961), and 
the Vietnam War. U.S. citizens have also often fought under the flags of 
other nations (Neutrality, 2001).  
This old Act states that U.S. citizens cannot fight against a country with which the U.S. is 
not at war. However, in accordance with the Special Forces-led PMF, the U.S. would be 
the sponsoring state, which would make it officially involved with the conflict. 
Therefore, the model would not conflict with the Neutrality Act of 1794.  
The next law that addresses a type of mercenary activity is the Arms Export 
Control Act (1968) which states 
Sales of defense products, components, services, and technologies are 
controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), as 
administered by the State Department. Defense goods and services are 
heavily restricted to countries the State Department deem enemy or 
terrorist states. In the past, these countries have included Afghanistan, 
China, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Vietnam. (Arms Export, 1968). 
This act, under Title 22 of the United States Code, states that “Arms control laws 
currently require firms engaged in training foreign militaries or providing services to 
foreign militaries to register and pay a fee. The State Department’s Office of Defense 
Trade Controls monitors the firms for compliance with the law and current US policy” 
(Smith, 2002/2003). Any PMC that would serve the USG would need to be licensed by 
the DoS; therefore, this act only supports the Special Forces-led PMF by providing 
additional regulatory measures.  
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Finally, the U.S. Constitution provides an avenue for the privatization of force. 
Article I, Section 8, empowers Congress to “declare war, grant letters of marque and 
reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.” If the U.S. Congress 
issued “letters of marque and reprisal”17 to a PMC or group of PMCs, then this would be 
a way to monitor and further regulate PMCs (Smith, 2002/2003) while allowing these 
companies to operate as a legitimate force for the USG.  
D. THE U.S. LEGAL CONTROL OVER PMCS   
What happens to PMC employees if they commit crimes? If a PMC employee is a 
U.S. citizen, then one way to prosecute is through the 2000 Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). This law allows for the U.S. to prosecute civilians who are 
under DoD contract if they commit crimes overseas that would normally receive more 
than one year imprisonment if conducted in the U.S. This can be an effective tool but is 
limited. The law only applies to DoD civilian contractors whose crimes would receive 
one year imprisonment. By definition, the DoS and CIA civilian contractors do not fall 
under this law.  
Another possible issue with this Act is that crimes that would not constitute one 
year imprisonment are not accounted for in this act. A crime of this nature might be petty 
theft. However, a PMC whose employee conducts such lesser crimes can easily fire the 
employee. Although the simple firing of an employee for a crime does not seem 
satisfactory for a human rights violation, it is probably appropriate for petty crimes.  
The final issue with the MEJA is that it does not cover foreign employees of PMC 
that are working for the DoD. When addressing this problem for Iraq-specific cases, Peter 
Singer (2004b) states that “This may require breaking new legal ground, such as testing 
the extraterritorial standards for civilian prosecution, requiring detention of the suspects 
until the Iraqi legal system gathers strength or even transferring jurisdiction to the 
international court.” This is an admitted weakness in the Special Forces-led PMF model. 
Most likely the only way to solve this issue would be to either turn the foreign employees 
 
17 “A ‘reprisal’ means an action taken in return for some injury. A reprisal could be a seizing of 
property or guilty persons in retaliation for an attack and injury. It could include forced used against the 
perpetrators for the redress of grievances. ‘Marque’ is related to ‘marching’ and means crossing or 
marching across a border in order to do a reprisal. Thus a Letter of Marque and Reprisal would authorize a 
private person, not in the U.S. armed forces, to conduct reprisal operations outside the borders of the 
U.S.A” (Foldvary, 2002). 
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over to the government of the country in which the operation occurred, or to deport the 
employees back to their home country for possible, but not guaranteed, prosecution.  
E. U.S. ARMY CONTRACTING PRACTICES AND REGULATIONS 
1. How the U.S. Government Contracts 
The following is a brief overview of how the USG contracts under the U.S. 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provided by Colonel (R) Michael R. Jorgensen, 
former Acting Director for Contracting, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Army (Procurement) (Personal Correspondence, 26 May 05). Outsourcing contracting 
begins with a need that the USG either cannot fulfill within itself or can be done better 
from an outside source. The agency within the USG that wants the outsourcing submits a 
Request for Proposal (RFP) with a requirement that usually takes the form of a Statement 
of Work (SOW) and describes what work needs to be done. Then the RFP is made 
available for bidding to prospective contractors for usually thirty days. However, 
depending on the requirement and time available, the USG might give the contract to a 
sole source contractor whereby the contract is awarded without a bidding process. Upon 
receipt of offers for the contract, assuming that it was not sole-sourced, the Contacting 
Officer (KO)18 awards the contract based on who, according to COL Jorgensen, offers 
“the best value solution to the customer, not necessarily the lowest price.” Next, a 
Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) is assigned as the USG’s point-of-contact for 
the contractor. The COR is usually assigned as an additional duty to a soldier or USG 
civilian. The COR has to monitor the contractor’s performance on a daily basis and notify 
the KO if the contractor is not fulfilling the requirements of the contract. COL Jorgensen 
emphasized that: 
The area of COR appointment/training/performance is probably that area 
of the contracting process most susceptible to problems. Inadequate or 
inappropriate COR performance can lead to costly disputes, claims, and 
contract terminations. The requirement for a COR ends when the contract 
is completed.  
Frank Camm, from the Rand Corporation, stated: “…the Army’s policy is clear. The 
problem is that Army hasn’t done a good job of training its people to oversee 
contractors…” (Matthews, 2004, November). 
 
18 Contracting officers use the initials “KO” and not “CO” because “CO” stands for Commanding 
Officer in the military.  
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2. The U.S. Government’s Responsibility to Contractors 
The way to determine what the USG’s responsibilities are to PMCs and their 
employees is to generally look at the contract and read what the KO committed the USG 
to do. The contract will indicate what the USG expects and what it will provide to the 
PMC. However, personnel recovery19 is a standing commitment the USG provides to 
PMCs. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2310.2, dated 22 December 2000, is a 
personnel recovery directive that states that the DoD is responsible for recovering 
American PMC employees. Paragraph 4.1 of the directive states: 
Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DoD civilian and 
contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, 
beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while participating in a 
U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the 
Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has a moral 
obligation to protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of its personnel by 
adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being used as 
leverage against the United States.  
Paragraph 4.2 states: “The Department of Defense has primary responsibility for 
recovering U.S. personnel identified in paragraph 4.1, above, who are deployed outside 
the United States and its territories.” U.S. PMC employees can hope for some type of 
recovery effort if they are captured while working for the USG; however, going back to 
the foreign employees of these companies, they cannot expect the U.S. to work towards 
their recovery. These employees should know this before they accept the job. 
F. THE LEGAL FUTURE OF PMCS IN THE U.S. 
There is every indicator that PMCs will be around for future military operations. 
One indicator is that there is a movement within the U.N. to not label PMCs as 
mercenaries. Since 2001, Shaista Shameem, the U.N. human rights commission’s special 
rapporteur on the use of mercenaries,20 understands that at times these organizations 
carry out a “vital job.” She has been trying to redefine and regulate the PMI while 
differentiating between legitimate PMCs and what one traditionally views as a 
 
19 Personnel Recovery means: “The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to recover 
captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and 
denied areas” (DoDD 2310.2, 2000, p. 2).  
20 Shameem replaced Ballesteros, who was the one who equated PMCs to mercenaries.  
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mercenary, e.g. the recently released men from a Harare, Zimbabwe jail who were 
allegedly going to Equatorial Guinea to overthrow its government (Haynes, 2004).  
The U.S. is currently taking steps to improve its handling of PMCs as well. On 12 
May 2004, U.S. Representative David Price (D-NC) wrote a letter to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) requesting “…that the GAO investigate the use of Private 
Military Firms (PMFs) by the Department of Defense and the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) in Iraq” (GAO Releases Report, 2005). This request was in response to 
the use of contractors at Abu Ghraib Prison and the deaths and subsequent postmortem 
mutilations of four employees of the North Carolina based PMC, Blackwater USA, in 
Fallujah, Iraq.   
The GAO report “Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve Surveillance 
on Department of Defense Service Contracts” (2005) found that “…insufficient 
surveillance occurred because surveillance is not as important to contracting officials as 
awarding contracts and therefore, does not receive the priority needed to ensure that 
surveillance occurs.” The report also discovered that surveillance personnel were not 
trained for the task nor evaluated based off of their performance for monitoring a 
contract. Furthermore, those who were assigned as surveillance personnel generally 
received the duty as part-time and did not have adequate time to perform the duties 
necessary for adequate surveillance (Opportunities to Improve, 2005). Although not 
expressly stated in the report, the surveillance responsibility mostly falls under the COR, 
as stated in the previous section.   
Subsequent to the GAO report, Representative Price submitted a new bill before 
the House on 25 June 2004 entitled “Transparency and Accountability of Security 
Contracting Act.” This bill did not pass through Congress but was reintroduced with 
some modification in 2005. The bill generally required contractors to provide information 
about their employees, full cost accounting, casualty reporting, and hiring standards for 
PMCs.21 The general response to Representative Price’s bill is best stated by Doug 
Brooks, head of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), “We support all 
the transparency and accountability bits that are in the bill.” (Cole, 2005, May 16). For 
 
21 For the complete Bill, see Appendix C.  
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PMCs to be members of IPOA, these companies must agree to IPOA’s Code of Conduct 
which covers such areas as respect for human rights, transparency in their operations, 
accountability of employees’ actions, working for legitimate clients, operating as safely 
as possible, conducting a screening and vetting of employees, carrying insurance, and 
abiding by established Rules of Engagement (IPOA Code, 2005). That means that 
companies like MPRI, Blackwater, and Armor Group International PLC, which are 
current members, must meet this organization’s standards for membership.  
G. CONCLUSION  
 This chapter has provided the current international and domestic laws and 
perceptions on mercenaries/PMCs. The chapter has also addressed what laws apply or do 
not apply to the United States. The international laws are largely irrelevant to the USG 
outsourcing effort because the United States has not signed to the conventions which 
forbid “mercenaries.” However, these laws can affect the United States if it hires PMCs 
with employees from countries that have signed to some type of anti-mercenary law 
either internationally or domestically in their home country.  
Current USG contracting procedures are sufficient to manage PMCs. The 
shortcoming of the contracting process is on emphasis, not substance. For example, if 
there was enough CORs, with the appropriate training, for all contracts, then many of the 
outsourcing concerns could be alleviated. The USG is making efforts to better 
synchronize PMC operations with government operations but as the current laws and 
contracting practices stand now, there is sufficient regulation to conduct a Special Forces-
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V. A SPECIAL FORCES-LED PMF MODEL 
We will not send American troops to every battle, but America will 
actively prepare other nations for the battles ahead President George W. 
Bush’s speech 11 March 2002. – Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of 
Empire, 2004 
At a symposium in Washington D.C., Erik Prince, Blackwater USA’s CEO, 
suggested the addition of a “contractor brigade” to augment the U.S. military. “There’s 
consternation in the DoD about increasing the permanent size of the army … We want to 
add 30,000 people, and they talked about costs anywhere from $3.6bn to $4bn to do that. 
Well, by my math, that comes out to $135,000 per soldier…We could do it certainly 
cheaper” (Hodge, 2005, February 10). Take Prince’s idea and add Special Forces 
management and the Special Forces-led PMF model presented in this chapter takes 
shape. Before the model is discussed, an appropriate setting helps illustrate where this 
model could be employed. The on-going situation in Darfur, Sudan provides that setting.  
A. THE SETTING 
Thousands of black-Africans, also known as non-Arab Sudanese, civilians have 
been killed by Arab-African militias (allegedly backed by the Sudanese government). 
This is a response to a black rebel uprising in the region that started in early 2003 when 
the non-Arab rebel groups attacked government installations. The Sudanese government 
has not only been accused of supporting the violence against the non-Arabs but has also 
been accused of using its air force to attack civilian villages. During Colin L Powell’s 
tenure as the U.S. Secretary of State, he labeled the conflict as genocide. However, the 
United States decided not to send troops.  
The option of putting U.S. troops on the ground in Darfur was never 
seriously considered in administration discussions, [DoS] officials said. 
The U.S. combat forces are stretched thin by long deployments in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and the administration has shown little appetite for deploying 
troops for what is sometimes called humanitarian intervention. It’s just not 
a viable option (McManus, 2005).  
The African Union did send troops. The current U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza 
Rice, stated “We want to be as active as we possibly can in support of that [AU] 
mission.” The civilian death toll is between 60,000 and 400,000 with 2.4 million 
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displaced people from their homes. (McManus, 2005). What if the United States wanted 
to help the Darfur citizens without committing troops? One option is to hire PMCs.  
According to the IPOA, in October of 2004, DoD hired two PMCs, the PAE 
Group and DynCorp for $20 million, to support around 3,500 AU troops in the Darfur 
region of Sudan. According to the State Department, the PMCs will build camps, 
maintain vehicles and radios, procure office equipment, and provide transport for 
equipment and personnel (Simeone, 2004, October 15). Then in early 2005, the U.S. 
offered around $50 million in aid, which included air transport of peacekeepers, 
equipment, and military advisor to the AU towards the peacekeeping effort supporting 
the cease-fire in the Darfur, Sudan (McManus, 2005). But what if this support did not 
help and the situation only got worse with time?  
Now let us suppose some hypothetical events. Suppose the current situation in 
Darfur gets to the point where the U.N. labels it a genocide. With memories of the 
Rwanda genocide, 22 the U.N. Security Council authorizes a Chapter VII intervention to 
protect the non-Arab Sudanese. Let us further suppose, the United States does not want to 
commit anymore troops to yet another operation, but does want to help the people of 
Darfur for not only humanitarian reasons but also because this area could become a 
sanctuary for Al Qaeda in the future if something is not done in the present. By the 
definition provided in Chapter I, this situation is or is becoming a “small war.” Next, the 
United States steps up its contribution to the intervention; it supplies a very small 
contingent of U.S. soldiers backed by several PMCs to not only support the operation but 
also to provide security for the people of Darfur. This mission would consist of providing 
security for medical assistance, food relief, water purification, and all other manners of 
aid. Also within this plan, would be a security training effort by the United States’ 
contribution for the victimized Darfur residents. The Special Forces-led PMF could 
operate in this situation.    
B. THE MODEL 
The Special Forces-led PMF model consists of trained Special Forces personnel 
acting as CORs over a group of PMCs to conduct a given operation. The design of this 
 
22 Reigning Secretary General, Kofi Annan, was the Chief of Peace Keeping Operations for the U.N. 
during the Rwanda genocide.  
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model largely eliminates previous risks involved with hiring PMCs. It also keeps the 
PMCs within the applicable international/regional laws regarding mercenaries.     
The reason why the U.S. Army Special Forces are chosen as the managers or 
contracting officer representatives of the PMF is because of the Special Forces unique 
capability and directive to manage surrogate forces in a UW or small war environment. 
Although the size of the Special Forces element would vary depending on the mission 
requirements, for the Darfur example, the Special Forces element could be a Special 
Forces Operational Detachment – Alpha (SFODA).23 The Psychological Operations 
(PSYOPS) and Civil Affairs (CA) elements that generally deploy on these types of 
missions would be represented by member from each organization to help manage their 
respective PMC and/or advise the commander in their areas of expertise. Because of the 
sensitive and strategic nature of the operation, a Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer 
would need to be attached. This would bring the total U.S. uniformed military presence to 
fifteen personnel. Each member of the element, with the exception of the JAG, could act 
as the COR for one to three PMCs.24 Since a SFODA is designed to manage a battalion 
size element of indigenous force (usually around 600 personnel), that means the total 
force would be around 615.25  
The Special Forces element would serve as the uniformed representatives of the 
USG. There are several reasons why elements of the U.S. military must be in charge of 
the PMF. The first reason is that if the United States only were to send a private force to 
fight a small war instead of the U.S. military, there would be a perception that the United 
 
23 A SFODA doctrinally consists of one commander (a Captain), one warrant officer, one team 
sergeant, one operations/intelligence sergeant, two NCO weapons sergeants, two NCO engineer sergeants, 
two NCO medical sergeants, and two NCO communications sergeants for a total of twelve men. When the 
ODA begins a planning sequence, their members break down into staff planning cells that loosely mirror a 
battalion level staff. For example, the SFODA commander simply serves as the commander, the warrant 
officer serves as the chief of staff, the team sergeant plans the operations, the operations/intelligence officer 
plans the intelligence, the medical sergeants plan the personnel and medical, the weapons sergeants help 
plan the operations, the engineer sergeants plan the logistics, and the communication sergeant plans the 
communications.    
24 Three is a good maximum number. The U.S. Army generally works on threes, e.g. three squads to a 
platoon, three platoons to a company, three companies to a battalion, and so on. Although there are 
exceptions to this “three” trend, it still remains a comfortable number of elements to manage.  
25 The actually number that would be needed for the operation would have to be determined by a 
mission analysis, which was not conducted for this thesis. This number is used for illustrative purposes 
only.  
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States did not care enough about the situation to send its own troops. The uniformed 
personnel not only serve the role as the USG representative but also show the 
international community that the force represents a U.S. led military effort instead of 
simply a hired “bunch of mercenaries” by the United States to do its undesirable work. 
By placing elements of the Special Forces as CORs, then the United States can honestly 
state that the mission is a U.S. military led operation. This would not deter the pessimists 
who might still claim that the United States did not care enough to send its own troops, 
but the fact of the matter is that the U.S. military is over-deployed as it is, but because the 
United States cares about Sudan’s situation, it, nonetheless, could choose (for this 
example) to send what support it can.  
The second reason why such a force would have to be led by the U.S. military is 
accountability. As discussed in the Chapter III, there is a risk that PMCs could act outside 
the boundaries of the law or contrary to U.S. policy if left on their own. The managing 
Special Forces element would be present to either ensure that these violations do not 
occur or, if a violation does occur, it is reported and handled at the appropriate levels. 
The commander of the Special Forces element would also be the accountable officer for 
the operation, thereby eliminating chain-of-command issues. Also, because the Sudan 
mission would be a DoD operation, the U.S. PMC employees would clearly fall under the 
MEJA. The PMC employees that are local residents of Darfur would fall under Sudanese 
law and, as it seems to stand now; those employees who are neither Sudanese nor 
American would most likely fall under their country of origin’s laws or be prosecuted in 
an ICC.  
The final reason for the U.S. military leading the PMF is that if one or more of the 
PMCs involved with the small war had to be fired or relieved, a U.S. military unit on the 
ground would be necessary for the continuity of effort. This is a unique capability with 
hiring a privatized force as opposed to using other national forces. If one of the AU units 
commits repetitive crimes or human rights violations, and shows that it is incapable of 
conducting the operation effectively, what would happen to the unit? Probably some 
investigation into the matter would occur, but it would be difficult to remove that national 
military force from Sudan for political reasons. However, a PMC is a business that is 
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expected to perform to a predetermined standard for a job and if that job is not 
accomplished accordingly, then, like any other business, that company can be fired.  
One fear associated with this example might be that a fired PMC could choose to 
not leave and could try to use violence to take control of the situation. Although there are 
not any modern examples of PMCs turning on their employers, this is a course of action 
that would need to be addressed before the mission. This situation would be similar to the 
Canadian situation described in Chapter III. If this did happen, then the most likely 
solution would be to deploy U.S. troops to remove the PMC. Of course, at this point the 
operation would be a failure if not a complete embarrassment. To avoid this, the right 
PMCs would have to be hired at the outset.  
The reputation of the individual PMCs is important when determining their 
eligibility for employment. For this model, it would be best to hire U.S. based PMCs for 
at least the major parts of the operation. These companies would be licensed by the DoS 
to conduct the operation. For cost cutting measures or local expertise, the companies 
would understandably hire non-U.S. personnel to fill complement their ranks. It may 
even be better for the companies to hire the locals of Darfur to infuse money into the 
local economy as well as attaining local knowledge of the environment. But the 
management should be American because the management would arguably be a 
stakeholder in U.S. foreign policy, since the United States would then be homeland to 
management personnel. After all, most of the U.S. PMC employees were once in the U.S. 
military themselves, so they probably would retain the same values and bearing that they 
possessed while serving. But no matter how good or bad the PMCs are, the management 
of them has to be done well.  
The way to do this is to train the Special Forces early in the mission planning 
sequence as CORs. For the Darfur mission the ODA would be assigned and then 
immediately trained on how to be CORs. This training would teach the members of the 
ODA how to manage the contract and establish clear lines of responsibility from the 
PMCs through the ODA to the USG.  
The ODA would then conduct a mission analysis to determine the task 
organization necessary to accomplish the operation. Upon completion of the initial 
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planning, the ODA would make a RFP and provide it to a KO. The KO would put the 
contract out for bidding or assign “sole sourcing” if the situation required it. Once all of 
the PMCs were arranged, the ODA could continue planning with the PMC representative.  
The organization of the actual PMF would be determined during the mission 
planning. But with the existing PMCs found on the World Wide Web (see Appendix B), 
Figure 6 illustrates how a PMF could be assembled today to accomplish the mission in 
Darfur.  
 
COR Function Possible PMC(s) 
O&I Sergeant Intelligence 
AirScan Inc., CACI,  Kroll, ORION, SYTEX, 
Titan 
A Weapon Sergeant Operations 
Blackwater USA, CusterBattles, MGSI, 
RamOPS, SOC-SMG, TAP, Triple Canopy, 
WBA 
A Weapon Sergeant Training MPRI 
An Engineer Sergeant Logistics DynCorp, KBR, Vinnell 
A Communications Sergeant Communications DynCorp, RamOPS 
A Medical Sergeant Medical Blackwater USA, Triple Canopy, DynCorp 
An Engineer Sergeant Air  ICI 
The PSYOPS representative Public Relations 
There are not any PMCs that specifically work 
on public relations; however, a reputable 
civilian company could do the mission.  
 
Table 6. A Special Forces-Led PMF Model26 
 
A potential problem for this model that might occur in 2005 would be the manning of the 
PMF. Since there are two ongoing U.S. conflicts currently overstretching the military, so 
may the situation arise where PMCs could be overstretched as well. The reputable PMCs 
simply may not have the manpower to fill the needed slots for the Sudan mission. With 
20,000 PMC employees in Iraq, PMCs may have trouble continuing to recruit quality 
personnel for their organizations.  
 The hypothetical Darfur mission would not only be humanitarian in nature; but a 
significant level of security would also need to be attained for the mission to be 
successful. After all, the U.N. or United States could send an endless amount of aid, but if 
security were not established, then anyone with significant enough force could take the 
                                                 
26 None of the U.S. specific PMCs in Appendix B were left off the list due to their reputation; 
however, their reputation would have to be considered before contracting.  
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aid from the people who needed it the most. The PMF would have to establish security, at 
least initially, and then train some elements within Darfur to secure themselves. This 
would probably be done by slowly training local security personnel and gradually 
integrating them into the PMF. As the local force got bigger the PMF could get smaller 
and then eventually disappear. That means that one of the conditions for mission success 
would be when the citizens of Darfur could secure themselves. In other words, the PMF 
would have to work itself out of a job, which is counterintuitive to the business world, so 
the PMF would need to be regulated by the contract.  
C. THE CONTRACT 
A concept to understand with a contract is that “[i]t is impossible to specify a 
contract which will cover all eventualities” (Rubin, 1990, p. 7). If one could, that means 
that someone could foresee all possible contingencies, branches, alternatives, and 
deviations of a given operation before they occur. Although this is probably not possible, 
it may be possible to ensure the contract is written in such a way that the interests of the 
PMCs involved with the operation are aligned with that of the U.S.’s interests. Instead of 
creating an actual contract in this thesis for the prescribed force, this section addresses the 
critical aspects of the contract that needs to be in place to effectively manage the Special 
Forces-led PMF. The critical areas of the contract could be found in the requirement 
section, and terms and conditions section of the contract.   
The SOW that the SFODA develops for the RFP generally becomes the 
requirements section of the contract. These are the detailed requirements derived from a 
mission analysis that the individual PMCs would have to perform in order to be 
considered successful for the contract. These detailed requirements might also be 
considered the “measures of effectiveness” section of the contract. An example of a 
requirement for a PMC is the following: conduct aerial re-supply and troop movements 
for 1000 flight hours a month with the ability to go higher depending on mission 
requirements. Then under the terms and conditions section of the contract, the amount for 
this requirement would be addressed with an agreed upon amount for additional flight 
hours as necessary.  
In addition to the paying of the contract, the legal controls over the PMCs are 
found under the terms and conditions section. As stated in the previous section, since this 
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would be under a DoD contract then the PMC employees would be covered under the 
2000 MEJA. But if that is not enough, then in the terms and conditions section of the 
contract, a provision could be established that prescribes that the contractors would fall 
under U.S. laws for American citizens or the laws of the country from which the 
employee originates. The second part of this requirement would be difficult at best; 
therefore, the non-U.S. citizens would have to understand that they might fall under the 
local laws, in this case – Sudan. This requirement may be too difficult for some to accept, 
and the PMCs would probably lose some of the potential employee pool, but it is 
necessary that the U.S. military maintains complete control of the PMCs.  
Also under the terms and conditions section would be how the PMCs would be 
paid. A fear involved with hiring PMCs is that these companies might encourage a 
conflict to continue in order to reap the financial benefits. To avoid this possibility, a 
contract has to be written that encourages PMCs to end on time or early. That means that 
financial bonuses could be awarded upon an early success of the mission or financial 
penalties could be assessed for an unacceptable delay in the missions success.  
The construction of the contract is a difficult task and requires long and intensive 
hours of analysis to derive at a detailed but flexible contract that would satisfy the PMCs’ 
and the USG’s needs. The key to the contracting process is to build in flexibility for when 
unforeseen circumstances arise. Unfortunately, the more flexible the contracts, the more 
likely the PMCs are going to require more money to conduct the operation, which to the 
unfamiliar observer may seem exorbitant. However, the Special Forces element would be 
present to ensure the USG received the appropriate value for cost.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The Special Forces-led PMF model can work given the right conditions. Does it 
accomplish what it sets out to do? This model does eliminate the need for a large U.S. 
troop deployment, so it accomplishes the main concern for this thesis. The reaction to 
PMC employees dying on this mission is yet to be seen; however, thus far, the general 
public seems to respond less emotionally to contractors being killed instead of soldiers.  
Because the USG would hire U.S. companies to conduct a U.S. supported 
mission, these PMCs would easily fall out of the definition as mercenaries. So legally, 
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this model could operate in Darfur. The exception would be foreign, non-Sudanese, 
employees of the PMCs. Their role may more closely resemble that of a mercenary and 
would require careful planning when considering employing this type of additional 
































































VI. CONCLUSION  
In many cases, these [PMCs] are either carrying out foreign policy 
directly, or at least working within acceptable boundaries. – David 
Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 1998 
This thesis has argued that a Special Forces-led PMF could be an effective force 
multiplier for the U.S. armed forces if properly managed. How Special Forces are used as 
contracting officer representatives is critical. Special Forces should not be used for 
routine contracts, particularly in fields other than UW. Humanitarian Assistance (HA) 
may seem disassociated from UW, but if one were to review a history of HA actions, it is 
apparent that these missions are usually conducted in a UW environment, e.g. Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Haiti, to name but a few.   
A. SUMMARY OF THE WORK 
In the introductory chapter, several assumptions are put forth, the most important 
of which is that the U.S. will have the political will to execute a Special Forces-led PMF 
plan. The chapter also defines important terms for the thesis, especially “small wars.”  
The second chapter provides five cases that demonstrate the USG’s historical 
willingness to conduct warfare through other entities or people. This is referred to as the 
use of surrogates and is categorized in U.S. military doctrine as unconventional warfare. 
Also under the same doctrine, Special Forces are the responsible body to conduct UW.   
The third chapter addresses the risks involved with hiring PMCs and how to 
mitigate those risks. After evaluating the risk mitigations, one can see that PMCs can be 
trusted to conduct some operations, but probably not extremely critical operations. 
Control measures are the key to ensure a trusting relationship between the USG and 
PMCs.  
The fourth chapter deals with the legal issues surrounding PMCs and mercenaries. 
International laws currently only deal with mercenaries and not PMCs. The USG has not 
signed to any of the conventions regarding the restriction of mercenary use and thus is 
not bound by these conventions. However, the USG must be cognizant of the affects of 
these conventions when conducting operations in the international community. Also, the 
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USG has extensive contracting procedures that cover the use of PMCs. These procedures 
have to be stressed and followed for the effective management of PMCs.  
The fifth chapter presents a Special Forces-led PMF model set in a “small war” 
scenario. The current situation in Darfur, Sudan is used as the setting for the model. The 
model addresses the issues, risks, and concerns associated with hiring PMCs to conduct 
operations. It also discusses some key points within a contract that must be addressed for 
effective management of a PMC.  
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are some particularly relevant concepts on the PMC topic that have not 
been addressed or fully developed in this thesis. This section suggests some issues for 
what should be further researched in the study of the PMI.  
The first issue is the standardization and improvement of PMC regulation. 
Although this thesis argues that there are enough laws to govern a Special Forces-led 
PMF, most in the industry argue that more regulation is needed. For example, the 
Government of the United Kingdom has conducted Parliamentary-level directed research 
to investigate how the PMI should be regulated. The British government produced a 
“green paper” on the subject titled Private military companies: Options for regulation that 
addresses such topics as accountability, sovereignty, economic exploitation, human 
rights, and moral objections. The U.S. could benefit from a similar Congressional level 
study.  
The second issue is the PMI’s attraction of skilled personnel away from the ranks 
of the U.S. military. Retention continues to be problematic. The allure of a PMC is 
obvious: ex-military personnel can work when they want to, not deal with the 
bureaucracy of the military, have an exciting job that uses their skills attained in the 
military, and receive a salary two or three times greater for doing a job they did before. 
Stopping this exodus from the military would be hard without regulating what jobs a 
departing soldier can conduct after leaving the military.  
The third issue is that there should be a comparison of the cost of overseas 
deployment between a U.S. soldier and a PMC employee. It is too simple to compare 
how much a soldier earns in salary in relation to a PMC employee. The appropriate 
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comparison is how much each person costs the USG. The deployment cost of a PMC 
employee is probably fairly easy to evaluate, but the soldier can be deceptively 
complicated. One cannot just use basic pay for a soldier. As stated in the introduction, 
there are many factors that vary from soldier to soldier that can cause a considerable 
expense to the USG. A couple of these factors are an individual soldier’s use of military 
medical and recreation facilities.  
The fourth issue arises when one of the U.S.-contracted PMCs hires third party 
nationals, not U.S. nor indigenous forces. There is not a clear-cut law on how these 
employees are legally regulated. The following questions must be addressed: Do they fall 
under U.S. law? Do they fall under the country’s laws in which they are operating, or do 
they fall under their home county’s laws?  
Finally, contractor billing is a significant issue for the USG. For example, Custer 
Battles LLC has been accused of overcharging the USG by at least $50 million for work 
done in Iraq according to Robert Isakson, a former employee of that company (Hastings, 
2005). It seems that an extra measure of oversight, or strict enforcement of existing 
oversight, will be needed to protect the USG’s interests.  
C. FINAL COMMENTS 
The reason for this thesis is simple: alleviate the strain on the U.S. armed forces 
caused by overseas deployments, but still protect important U.S. national interests and 
provide humanitarian assistance around the world times of need. The United States feels 
a moral obligation to help less fortunate countries gain the freedom and democracy that 
the Americans cherish. However, the United States lacks the unlimited resources to help 
every country in the world that needs such assistance, so alternatives must be found. The 
Special Forces-led PMF model is an alternative. If the current operational deployment 
tempo of U.S. troops continues in the years ahead, the model presented in this thesis may 
be a viable alternative to commitment of U.S. armed forces personnel in conflicts below 



































APPENDIX A. DOCTRINAL DESCRIPTIONS OF SMALL WARS 
The three terms below are provided to further describe the meaning of “small 
war” in which the Special Forces-led PMF would operate. The term “small war” does not 
appear in either JP 1-02 or FM 1-02 but when the terms Military Operations Other than 
War (MOOTW), Stability Operations, and Support Operations are combined with 
counter-insurgency and UW, an image can be made about the environment of a “small 
war” as applied to this thesis.  
MOOTW: “Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the 
range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to 
complement any combination of other instruments of national power and occur before, 
during, and after the war” (JP 1-02, 2004, p.336).  
Stability Operations: This is a U.S. Army/Marine only term which means the 
following: “Operations that promote and protect US national interests by influencing the 
threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a 
combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in 
response to crisis” (FM 1-02, 2004).  
Support Operations: This is also only a U.S. Army/Marine term which means 
the following: “Operations that employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or 
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APPENDIX B. PMC WEBSITE OVERVIEW 
 The following is a list of PMCs that currently advertise their services on the 
World Wide Web. This is not an all inclusive list but, nonetheless, an attempt has been 
made to be as thorough as possible. Generally, to be in this appendix, the PMC has to 
provide combat/security services or direct combat support services. Companies that 
provide maintenance support for strategic lift aircraft or are involved with privatized 
housing for U.S. military bases are examples of PMCs that are not included in this list. 
Also, as the name of this appendix indicates, if a PMC does not have a website or the 
website could not be found, then that company was not included.  
- AD Consultancy, http://www.adconsultancy.com/
 
 AD Consultancy is a UK company that provides security services to 
include assessments, protection, and surveillance. Its security extends to aviation, 
maritime, and oil/gas assets as well.  
 
- Aegis Defence Services, http://www.aegisdef.com/.  
 
 Aegis is a UK company that was founded in 2000 and run by Tim Spicer, 
founder of Sandline International and former Scots Guard. It provides risk assessment 
and mitigation services, intelligence training and operations, and technical support for 
new equipment. It was recently awarded a $293 million "cost-plus" contract ($92 million 
in the first year for a three year maximum of $293 million) to manage private security for 
the Iraq Program Management Office (PMO). It was awarded by an Army transportation 
group in Virginia. The contract calls for 75 x 8 person executive protection teams for 
PMO personnel, an intelligence clearing house, and a vetting service for PMCs operating 
in Iraq.  
 
- AKE Limited, http://www.akegroup.com/
  
 AKE Group, founded in 1991, is a UK company that provides risk 
management, intelligence, and medical services.  
 
- AirScan Inc., http://www.airscan.com/  
 
 AirScan is a U.S. company that provides air, ground, and maritime 
surveillance, but primarily focuses on airborne surveillance and aviation requirements. Its 





- AMA Associates Ltd, http://www.ama-assoc.co.uk/index.htm  
 
 AMA Associates Ltd. is a UK company that provides training and 
consultancy in the following: risk and crisis management, investigation, 
surveillance/counter-surveillance, security, counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, and 
executive protection.It touts extensive Special Forces expertise and seems to focus on 
maritime security.  
 
- ArmorGroup, http://www.armorgroup.com/  
 
 ArmorGroup, whose predecessor firm was Defense Systems Limited, is a 
UK company that conducts global risk management services with over 8,000 employees 
in 40 countries. The company focuses on global security risk management, security 
training and services, and mine action services.  
- BAE Systems, http://www.baesystems.com/
BAE Systems is a UK company that designs, manufactures, and supports 
military aircraft, surface ships, submarines, space systems, radar, avionics, C4ISR, 
electronic systems, and guided weapons. It specializes in systems integration, complex 
software and hardware development and advanced manufacturing. 
- Beni Tal, http://www.beni-tal.co.il/  
 
 Beni Tal is an Israeli company that focuses on executive protection and 
weapons training. Its website is not very detailed.  
 
- Blackwater USA, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/.  
 
 Blackwater USA, founded by ex-SEALs Erik Prince and CEO Gary 
Jackson, is comprised of five companies: Blackwater Training Center, Blackwater Target 
Systems, Blackwater Security Consulting, Blackwater Canine, and Blackwater Air 
(AWS). Blackwater USA focuses on training and security, with the emphasis on 
diplomatic security.  
 
- CACI International Inc., http://www.caci.com/
 
 CACI is a U.S. company that specializes in systems integration, 
engineering services, managed network services, and knowledge management. This 
company also has hired contracted interrogators to the U.S. government.  
 
- Combat Support Associates (CSA), http://www.csakuwait.com/
 
 CSA is a U.S. company that focuses on combat service support for U.S. 
military installations in Kuwait where its contract will expire in 2009. The company 
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primarily performs the duties of division and corps level military police by providing the 
security guards for the instillations.  
 
- Control Risks Group, http://www.crg.com/html/index.php
 
 Control Risks Group is a UK company, founded in 1975 as an 
international business risk consultant. It also does crisis management, investigations, 
information security, and discreet armed protection. It claims a 375 person database with 
17 offices worldwide.  
 
- Cubic Corporation, http://www.cubic.com/
 
 Cubic Corporation provides realistic live combat training systems for 
military forces as well as virtual training systems, constructive simulation support, force 
modernization, battle command training and education, electronic warfare simulators and 
engineering and technical support. The group also supplies tactical battlefield systems 
and communications electronics, including secure data links and surveillance receivers 
for "C4ISR" applications and search-and-rescue avionics.
 
- CusterBattles LLC, http://www.custerbattles.com/
 
 CusterBattles is a U.S. company, founded in 2001, that provides security 
services/training, Threat Vulnerability Assessments (TVAs), surveillance, and emergency 
services, e.g. search and rescue. Its most notable contract was with the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq to secure the international airport.  
- Diligence LLC, http://www.diligencellc.com/
Diligence LLC is both a UK and U.S. company, although its website uses 
British spellings for words and was jointly founded by American and British intelligence 
officers. It focuses on global risk consulting, corporate intelligence, Threat Vulnerability 
Assessments (TVAs), and some security training.  
- DynCorp, http://www.dyncorp.com/
 DynCorp is a U.S. company and recent subsidiary (Dec 2004) of Veritas 
Capital. Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) had owned DynCorp prior to Veritas 
purchase. DynCorp provides aircraft maintenance, technology, telecommunications, 
computer network integration, and infrastructure management, especially logistics and 
services. It also provides security and life support services.  
- Erinys International, http://www.erinysinternational.com/
 Erinys International provides international security services and risk 
consultancy that focuses on the sub-Sahara Africa and Middle East areas. It recently was 
awarded a $40mil contract to guard Iraq oil installations.  
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- Genric UK Ltd., http://www.genric.co.uk/
 Genric is a UK company that provides threat assessments, physical and 
personal security, counter-electronic surveillance, and training for evasive driving, 
surveillance, executive protection, and medical emergencies.  
- Global Marine Security Systems Company (GMSSCO), 
http://www.gmssco.com/
GMSSCO is both a U.S. and UK company that provides security 
training/solutions and risk management programs for maritime needs.  
- Global Risk International (GRI), http://www.globalrisk.uk.com/
GRI, incorporated in 1999, is a UK company that specializes in crisis 
management, kidnapping/extortion solutions, investigations, anti-terrorist training, and 
equipment procurement.  
- Global Risk Strategies, http://www.globalrsl.com/
 Global Risk Strategies is a UK company, founded by Damien Perl, a 
former marine, and Charlie Andrews, a former Scot Guards officer. It provides political 
risk management, business facilitation, and peace support operations. It has been 
criticized for hiring 500 Gurkha and 500 Fiji soldiers in Iraq at considerably cheaper cost 
than western counterparts.  
- Group 4 Securicor, http://www.group4securicor.com
Group 4 Securicor is a UK company that began operations on 20 July 
2004 by merging Group 4 Falck and Securicor. It provides security services and systems, 
runs prisons, and provides cash transport services. It claims 340,000 employees in over 
100 countries. 
- Kellogg, Brown, & Root (KBR), http://www.halliburton.com/kbr/index.jsp
KBR is a U.S. company that is a subsidiary of Halliburton and provides 
engineering, construction, operations and maintenance, logistics, and project management 
services. KBR runs many of the U.S. military base camps around the world.  
- Hill & Associates, http://www.hill-assoc.com/  
 Hill & Associates, founded in 1992, is headquartered in Hong Kong and 
focuses on the business world, and, not really military environments. It provides asset 
protection, personal and physical security, and intelligence services.  
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- International Charter Incorporated (ICI), 
http://www.icioregon.com/aviation.htm.  
 
 ICI is a U.S. company that uses Russian aircraft for peacekeeping support, 
VIP transport, heavy lift, and relief services. It also can organize and train security forces 
and provide executive protection.  
 
- International Corporate Protection (ICP), http://www.icpgroup.ltd.uk/
 
 ICP is a UK company that provides corporate and personal security 
services, investigations, and security training.  
- International Intelligence Limited, http://www.int-int.info/
 International Intelligence Limited is a UK company that provides 
executive protection, surveillance, security training, and investigation. It claims a lengthy 
Special Air Service (SAS) database of names.  
- Janusian Security Risk Management, http://www.janusian.com/
Janusian Security Risk Management is a UK company and subsidiary of 
The Risk Advisory Group that focuses on security management, identifying threats, 
providing means and capabilities to manage the threat, and eliminating the threat, if 
necessary. It has been active in Iraq since 17 April 2003.  
- Kroll Associates, http://www.krollworldwide.com/
 Kroll is a U.S. company that provides security, intelligence, and 
investigation services.  
 -Meyer Global Security, Inc. (MGSI), 
http://www.meyerglobalforce.com/index.html. 
 MGSI is a U.S. company that specializes in Colombia but is willing to 
work globally. It can provide armed marine patrol vessels, four wheel drive SUV’s, 
sedans, armored vehicles, and helicopters. Its services focus on executive protection but 
can involve most any security work, e.g. convoy security. It hires ex-U.S. military 
Special Operations soldiers as well as having 400 Chilean Commandos on database. 
 
-Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), 
http://www.mpri.com/index.html. 
 
 MPRI is a U.S. company that operates world-wide and focuses on training, 
war gaming through simulations, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, force protection, law 
enforcement, and investigations. MPRI boasts a 12,500 database of ex-defense and other 
related personnel.  
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- Northbridge Services Group, http://www.northbridgeservices.com
 
 Northbridge Services Group is a UK company with an ex-U.S. Army 
officer as its president. It offers security training, executive protection, Special 
Operations (SO) and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) capabilities, electronic and 
human intelligence gathering, peace keeping and mine clearing abilities, and medical 
support/evacuation.  
  
- ORION Scientific Systems (ORION), http://www.orionsci.com/
 
 ORION is a U.S. company that specializes in software development for 
military and law enforcement use. It currently has a Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
program used by anti-gang units in the U.S.  
 
- RamOPS Risk Management Group, http://www.ramops.com/
 
RamOPS is a U.S. company that conducts threat assessments, 
recommended precautions, and contingency planning for personnel, sites, and equipment. 
It provides executive protection, convoy escort, communications, information 
technology, and logistics support.  
 
- Sandline International, http://www.sandline.com/site/index.html
 
 Sandline International of the UK closed down operations on 16 April 2004 
due to the “…general lack of governmental support for Private Military Companies 
willing to help end armed conflicts in places like Africa…” This company is referenced 




 SECOPEX is a French company that specializes in security, intelligence, 
and security training missions. It also offers specific services like convoy security, base 
camp construction, communication architecture, logistics, and executive protection. It 
claims a 600 person database filled with ex-military 
- Securicor Hong Kong, http://www.securicor.com/hk.htm
 Securicor Hong Kong, founded in 1963, is a subsidiary or Securicor Asia 
group. It provides manned and electronic surveillance and risk management consulting.  
- Special Operations Consulting – Security Management Group, http://www.soc-
smg.com/
SOC-SMG is a U.S. security company that provides PSD, international 
force protection, consulting, security services, armed protection, threat management, 
investigation, training, and large-scale security operations.  
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- SYTEX, Inc., http://www.sytexinc.com/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=1
 SYTEX is a U.S. company and a subsidiary of The SYTEX Group, Inc. 
(TSGI). It provides multidisciplinary services for program and systems management, 
logistics, homeland security, intelligence, engineering, operations and maintenance, 
computer security training, and biometrics and tagging/sensor capabilities. 
- Terrorist Anticipation & Prevention (TAP), http://www.tapinternational.com/
 TAP is a U.S. company that conducts threat and vulnerability assessments, 
security force evaluation, and anti-terrorism solutions. Its website is not very detailed. 
- The Steele Foundation, http://www.steelefoundation.com/
 The Steele Foundation, founded in 1989, is a U.S. company that 
specializes in risk management, investigation, security training, executive protection, and 
convoy security. It has a strong presence currently operating in Iraq.  
- Titan Corporation, http://www.titan.com/
 Titan, founded in 1981, is a U.S. company that focuses on creating, 
modifying, and implementing Command, Control, Communications, Computer, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment. It also specializes in 
Information Technology (IT) research and application. Recently it has provided 
translators and interpreters to the U.S. government for Iraqi operations.  
- TOR International, http://www.torinternational.com/
 TOR is a UK company that provides threat assessment, satellite tracking, 
safety equipment supply, and security and crisis management.   
- Triple Canopy, http://www.triplecanopy.com/
Triple Canopy, founded by ex-Delta Force operator John Peters, is a U.S. 
company that specializes in executive protection and site security. It claims the highest 
concentration of ex-“Tier One” personnel.  
- UK Defence Services LTD., http://www.ukdefence.co.uk/main.htm
UK Defence Services is a UK company that provides security guards, 
investigation, canine assets, executive protection, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), 




- Vinnell Corporation, http://www.vinnell.com/.  
 Vinnell Corporation is a U.S. company and a subsidiary of Northrop 
Grumman Company that operates world-wide. It offers services that range from facilities 
operator to logistic support to military training.  
 
-Wade-Boyd & Associates LLC (WBA), http://www.wade-boyd.com/
 
 WBA, founded in 2003 by Marvin Wade and Rick Boyd, is a U.S. 
company that provides Personal Security Details (PSD), K-9 bomb detection, convoy 




APPENDIX C. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
SECURITY CONTRACTING ACT 
109th CONGRESS 
1st Session 
H. R. 2011 
To require accountability for personnel performing private security functions under 
Federal contracts.  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
April 28, 2005 
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina (for himself, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. SNYDER, and Mr. 
CRAMER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period 
to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned  
 
A BILL 
To require accountability for personnel performing private security functions under 
Federal contracts.  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE 
This Act may be cited as the `Transparency and Accountability in Security 
Contracting Act'. 
SEC. 2. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO PERSONNEL PERFORMING 
PRIVATE SECURITY FUNCTIONS UNDER FEDERAL 
CONTRACTS.  
 (a) Accountability Requirements for Personnel Performing Private 
Security Functions Under Federal Contracts- 
(1) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE CERTAIN INFORMATION 
ABOUT PERSONNEL PERFORMING PRIVATE SECURITY 
FUNCTIONS- Each covered contract shall require the contractor to 
provide to the contracting officer for the contract, not later than 5 days 
after award of the contract, the following information regarding private 
security functions performed under the contract: 
(A) Number of persons to be used to perform such 
functions. 
(B) A description of how such persons are trained to carry 
out tasks specified under the contract relating to such functions. 
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(C) A description of each category of activity relating to 
such functions required by the contract. 
(2) UPDATES OF INFORMATION- The information provided 
under paragraph (1) shall be updated during contract performance as 
necessary. 
(3) SAFEGUARDING INFORMATION- The head of each agency 
awarding a covered contract shall take such actions as are necessary to 
protect any information provided under paragraph (1) that is a trade secret, 
or commercial or financial information, from disclosure to persons outside 
the Government. 
(4) ACCOUNTING- Each covered contract shall include the 
following requirements: 
(A) Upon award of the contract, the contractor shall 
provide cost estimates of salary, benefits, insurance, materials, 
logistics, travel, administrative costs, and other costs of carrying 
out private security functions under the contract. 
(B) Before contract closeout (other than closeout of a firm, 
fixed price contract), the contractor shall provide a report on the 
actual costs of carrying out private security functions under the 
contract, in the same categories as provided under subparagraph 
(A). 
(5) CASUALTY REPORTING- Each covered contract shall 
require full reporting to the contracting officer for the contract by the 
contractor of all personnel casualties in carrying out the contract. 
(6) OVERSIGHT- Before a covered contract is awarded, the head 
of the agency awarding the contract shall ensure that sufficient resources 
are available to enable contracting officers of the agency to perform 
oversight of the performance of the contract. 
(7) WAIVER AUTHORITY- 
(A) The head of the agency awarding a covered contract 
may waive a requirement of this section with respect to a contract 
in an emergency or exceptional situation, as determined by the 
head of the agency. Any such waiver shall be limited to the 
requirements that are impossible or impracticable to implement 
because of the emergency or exceptional situation. In any case in 
which the head of an agency waives a requirement under this 
section with respect to a contract, the agency head shall submit to 
the congressional committees listed in subparagraph (B) a report, 
within 30 days after the date of the waiver, that describes the 
contract, the waiver, the emergency or exceptional situation that 
justified the waiver, and a plan for bringing the contract into 
compliance with the waived requirements as soon as possible or an 
explanation of why the waiver needs to be permanent. 
(B) The congressional committees referred to in 
subparagraph (A) are the following: 
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(i) The Committees on Appropriations, Armed 
Services, Government Reform, and International Relations 
of the House of Representatives. 
(ii) The Committees on Appropriations, Armed 
Services, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
and Foreign Relations of the Senate. 
(b) Hiring, Training, and Equipment Standards Relating to Private 
Security Contractors- 
(1) REGULATIONS- Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development shall prescribe in regulations minimum standards 
(appropriate for each department or agency) for the persons that covered 
contractors may hire for the performance of private security functions 
under the contract, and minimum standards for the training of such 
persons, including the level of training and any certifications required. The 
standards may vary based on the duties of personnel, but must address past 
criminal activity, security clearance requirements, and other issues that 
either Secretary or the Administrator determines may lead to security or 
performance concerns. 
(2) GUIDANCE FOR EQUIPMENT- The Secretary of Defense, 
the Secretary of State, and the Administrator for the United States Agency 
for International Development shall issue guidance (appropriate for each 
department or agency) on equipment used for private security functions 
under covered contracts with the department or agency concerned, 
including appropriate levels of body armor and equipment armor, and a 
recommended list of re-armorers and weapons and armor manufacturers 
for complying with such guidelines. 
(3) CONSULTATION WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE- The 
Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development shall consult with the Secretary of Defense in 
developing regulations and guidance under this subsection. 
(c) Report on Cost Analysis Relating to Equipment- Not later than six 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, shall submit to Congress a report 
containing-- 
(1) an analysis of the costs to the Federal Government of 
purchasing equipment to supply to contractors to carry out private security 
functions under covered contracts in comparison to the costs to the Federal 
Government of reimbursing contractors for equipment purchased by the 
contractors to carry out such functions; and 
(2) such findings and recommendations as the Secretary considers 
appropriate. 
(d) Definitions- In this section: 
(1) COVERED CONTRACT- The term `covered contract' means-- 
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(A) a prime contract with the Department of Defense, the 
Department of State, or the United States Agency for International 
Development; 
(B) a subcontract at any tier under any prime contract with 
a department or agency referred to in subparagraph (A); or 
(C) a task order issued under a task or delivery order 
contract entered into by a department or agency referred to in 
subparagraph (A); 
if the work to be performed under the contract, subcontract, or task 
order includes private security functions to be performed outside the 
United States. 
(2) PRIVATE SECURITY FUNCTIONS- The term `private 
security functions', with respect to a covered contract, means-- 
(A) any activities for which personnel are allowed to carry 
weapons in the performance of the contract; or 
(B) the performance of any of the following: 
(i) Military logistics and maintenance. 
(ii) Interrogation of prisoners. 
(iii) Convoy security. 
(iv) Guarding vital facilities and personnel. 
(v) Tactical security work. 
(vi) Local force training. 
(e) Effective Date- This section shall apply to covered contracts entered 
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